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TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE STAFF (S-2) OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE
EUROPEAN THEATER AND THE CREATION OF THE U. S. ARMY'S MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

PHILLIP D. WRIGHT, MAJ, USA
B.A., WIDENER COLLEGE, CHESTER, PENNSYLVANIA, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE STAFF (S-2) OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND THE CREATION OF THE U. S. ARMY'S MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRANCH by Maj Phillip D. Wright, U.S.A., 102 pages.

This study investigates the slow improvement of U.S. Army tactical intelligence operations in North Africa and the ETO. During World War II, the U.S. Army improved its doctrine and combat procedures as it gained battlefield experience. Intelligence operations at the battalion and regimental level went against this pattern. After action reports mentioned the same problems with the performance of the S-2 sections. A 1943 after action report on S-2s in Tunisia sounded similar to a report issued in Germany in 1945.

In the 1930s, doctrine writers, at Fort Leavenworth, developed an excellent intelligence doctrine. Yet, the performance of S-2s in combat never matched the soundness of their doctrine. Reports identified problems with intelligence training and techniques. Although the U.S. Army identified the problems, and recommended fixes, the problems remained.

The exception to this trend was the Military Intelligence Service. This organization included linguists, order of battle, and photo interpreter teams. They shared with the S-2, FM 30-5 Combat Intelligence, the core manual of intelligence doctrine. The difference was in the quality of training. The resolution of this issue occurred after the Korean War. This conflict and the World War II experience prompted the creation of the U.S. Army's Military Intelligence Branch.

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Jill, I left my cave.

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Tempest.

They all have a piece of this thesis.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Research Question

The following question; How did World War II experience promote the creation of an Military Intelligence Branch? is the primary research question. To answer this primary research question, several supporting research questions require answers. What attributes contributed to an S-2's credibility? How did battalion and regimental commanders typically employ S-2s? What assets were available to the S-2 in the performance of his duties? Were battalion and regimental intelligence efforts flawed in operations? What were these flaws and their causes? Did these flaws prompt the creation of an MI branch? What was successful about intelligence operations at the battalion and regimental level?

Background

The Military Intelligence Corps came into existence on 1 July 1962. Its birth resulted from a very long labor that extended back to the American Revolution. Military intelligence reached its zenith in the American Revolution and declined in the succeeding two centuries.¹ However, generals and politicians recognized military intelligence as valuable and necessary to plan and conduct successful operations in war. Nonetheless, at the end of each conflict, military intelligence, along with a newly created training base and support structure, withered away. Generally, there were two reasons why this happened at the end of each conflict. First, there were budgetary concerns. Traditionally at the end of her wars, America dramatically reduced the size of her armed forces. In the scramble for dollars, intelligence was a bill payer. Secondly, America's senior military and political leaders viewed intelligence as a dirty business.

Epitomizing this attitude in 1929 was Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. Secretary Stimson stated, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail," as he ordered the shut down of the State Department's code section.² The U.S. Army throughout its history prided itself on being composed of gentlemen of the highest conservative standards. The senior leadership viewed military intelligence as not much more than a necessary evil. These two underlying themes still have some relevancy today. The view of intelligence as a dirty business normally falls on national organizations, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In the U.S. Army, this view is rapidly fading, although, occasionally some commanders express a distaste for the way intelligence does its business.

Therefore, the country and the U.S. Army entered each conflict without intelligence professionals, effective military intelligence organizations, institutional intelligence knowledge, or the capacity to train soldiers as intelligence specialists. This cycle of decline and rebirth continued from the end of the American Revolution through the Korean War.

In World War I, combat operations led to the establishment of an S-2 position at the regimental level.³ Commanders did not select objectives in relationship to the enemy or achieving far-reaching operational success. Commanders selected objectives solely on the basis of convenient and available terrain. American battalions attacked blindly seeking a ridge or a hill and suffered prohibitive personnel losses.

The post-World War period sees books and articles published on the importance of S-2s and intelligence at the regimental level based on the experiences of the assault battalions. At Fort Leavenworth, doctrine writers, influenced by the bitter experience of the French, German, and American armies, conceived an outstanding doctrine to serve as the framework and bible for U.S. Army tactical and strategic intelligence operations. The U.S. Army published Field Manual (FM) 30-5, Combat Intelligence, in 1940. Drafts of this document existed in the 1930s. It would serve as the doctrine for all intelligence operations including the S-2 functions.

Traditionally, doctrine writers do a poor job of predicting future battlefields. Although FM 30-5 did not predict precisely the battlefields of Europe in 1944, it was a resilient, common sense document that provided intelligence officers with the methodologies and functions to execute their business. Unfortunately, for many different reasons, intelligence battlefield performance did not quite realize the promise of the doctrine.

So, in the 1930s, intelligence doctrine flourished in the halls of the Command and General Staff School. However, by 1935, intelligence operations at all levels suffered from terrible neglect. In an era when infantry battalions had fewer than two hundred personnel, the S-2 position virtually faded from existence.⁴ The 1939 Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for an infantry regiment confirmed this state of affairs. Comments contained on the TOE noted that for peacetime operations, the role of the S-2 and S-3 were combined into one function.⁵

This doctrinal and administrative neglect reached its full expression in the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941. Unprocessed intelligence concerning the opposing forces went directly to the operations (S-3) officer and unit commander, ignoring the unit intelligence officer. The personnel in the S-2 section lacked their commander's confidence. Junior officers or headquarters company commanders drew the assignment of the S-2 position as an extra duty.⁶ The situation deteriorated to the extent that S-2s were rarely told of the arrival of classified documents to their units. The S-2's primary function revolved around the requisition of maps.⁷

These exercises, designed to bring the greatly expanding American army to a war footing, reinforced the traditionally poor treatment accorded S-2s in the U.S. Army. This legacy of neglect and disdain would greatly hinder the effectiveness throughout World War II and perhaps, beyond.

This was a surprising state of affairs. The U.S. Army learned many important lessons about S-2 operations which foreshadowed the after-action reports from Tunisia and the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during the Louisiana Maneuvers. Colonel Robert S. Allen served with the 3rd Army during World War II. He was a successful journalist who served in the Army

G-2 section. He would be badly wounded near the end of the war, losing an arm. He wrote several useful observations about intelligence issues in the Louisiana Maneuvers.

He compiled a list of "intelligence deficiencies," that he observed during the exercises.⁸ Some comments were meant for the G-2 sections at division or corps, but most of the findings were applicable to the battalion and regimental S-2. He complained about a "lack of intelligence consciousness."⁹ This was a common catch phrase in after-action reports during World War II. The report writer employed the term frequently when describing a failed attack or patrol. It meant that a commander or soldier failed to appreciate his intelligence responsibilities and suffered accordingly in combat. The U.S. Army outlined these responsibilities in most of its field manuals, whenever discussing intelligence operations. In the face of institutional prejudice and the constant flow of replacements to the front, intelligence consciousness did not significantly improve during the war.

The S-2 sections entered exercises with poorly trained personnel and a lack of organization. The U.S. Army did not adequately train the S-2 for his complicated and important duty. As a rule an S-2, throughout the war, could expect about two weeks of intelligence training spread over a year. The S-2 received much criticism for not properly training the intelligence & reconnaissance (I&R) platoon and line companies for their vital patrolling function. Intelligence training was not up to the standard of the doctrine.

There was a distinct lack of cooperation among the various staff sections (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4). During the war, there was noticeable friction between the S-2 and the S-3 sections. The S-2 could provide valuable information to support the S-3's planning function. Routinely, the S-3 ignored the S-2. Normally, the S-3 was senior to the S-2 in rank, and several times the S-2 became the assistant S-3, to the detriment of any intelligence support to the battalion or regiment.¹⁰

The S-2s failed to properly plan for missions and did not develop contingency plans. Probably, this was a result of poor training. Since the U.S. Army did not have a professional

intelligence corps for officers, very few officers with any previous intelligence experience became S-2s. If an officer had previous S-3 experience as an assistant, this did not necessarily mean those planning skills translated to executing intelligence missions. Unfamiliar with his duties and intelligence resources, this observation would be made on future battlefields.¹¹

The observers criticized S-2s for poor evaluation and interpretation of information. Again, this was a training issue. Predicting the future moves of an enemy or reducing battlefield uncertainty, was difficult tasks for experienced intelligence professionals. Evaluating information as it rapidly flowed into a command post (CP) from several sources was impossible on the two days training an officer received before becoming an S-2. Interpreting information to create combat intelligence was as difficult a process as evaluation. The S-2s failed at this function because their training and experience were inadequate. Throughout World War II, this was a common complaint against S-2s.¹²

The S-2 did not always properly disseminate his information. Messages were not clearly written. Often they were not sent to the units most in need of intelligence. Dissemination appeared to improve throughout the war. In the Louisiana Maneuvers, this may have been inexperience at dealing with communications on a large scale. Improvement during the war occurred because regardless of branch, everyone tended to receive some training in radio communications. Experience taught the S-2 what and when he needed to quickly disseminate his information.¹³

Finally, S-2s failed to properly employ their collection agencies. Specifically, this meant the I&R platoon. This was the regimental S-2's primary intelligence collection agency of patrol specialists. More often than not they served the S-2 in the CP to maintain map boards or acted as detail personnel to the headquarters commandant. The S-2 was only partially responsible for this misuse of the I&R platoon. The doctrine allowed the S-2 to use the platoon for CP duties. However, the S-2 was usually the most junior primary staff officer and could not prevent their misuse by more senior officers. This issue would be a reoccurring theme to the end of the war.¹⁴

In addition to institutionalized prejudice and misemployment in peacetime exercises, promotion concerns in the army damaged the importance of the S-2 position. Brigadier General Oscar W. Koch, the future G-2 of Third Army, noted that prewar officers seeking staff assignments believed that S-2 positions were at the bottom of the "prestige list."¹⁵ General Omar N. Bradley "scrupulously" avoided intelligence staff positions.¹⁶ Army officers viewed the S-2 and G-2 as harmful to promotion and the positions became an assignment for officers unsuited for command. This practice continued throughout World War II at all levels. General Edwin L. Sibert was General Bradley's 12th Army Group G-2. Reflecting the Army's negative attitude towards intelligence, General Sibert heard several times the comment: "I wonder what is wrong with him that he is the G-2."¹⁷

The officers placed in intelligence staff positions, S-2 or G-2, were consistently junior in rank to their fellow staff officers.¹⁸ Again, this reflected the neglect of the intelligence position. Commanders did not always support the intelligence position. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Barr was the G-2 of the 3rd Armored Division throughout World War II.¹⁹ In October 1944, in combat, his G-2 section functioned only 18 hours a day.²⁰ The other division staff elements performed continuous operations. Apparently, the division's commanding general, General Maurice Rose, did not require Barr's services eight hours each day. Moreover, in the planning and employment of the division armored reconnaissance battalion the G-2 "was not consulted nor were many of his recommendations accepted."²¹

The officers in the intelligence field were not alone in receiving this poor treatment. Enlisted personnel endured this state of affairs, as well. This prejudice manifested itself in several ways. However, the poor promotion rate among the intelligence sergeants was an especially painful experience. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) George S. Patton was the G-2 of the Hawaiian Division in 1926. In his G-2 section was Technical Sergeant (TSGT) Luth. TSGT Luth was about to retire and LTC Patton wanted to promote him to Master Sergeant (MSG). TSGT Luth was a member of the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP), the forerunner to the Counterintelligence Corps

of World War II. LTC Patton wrote a letter to the executive officer of the War department G-2 and bestowed great praise on his sergeant and asked that he receive special attention at the promotion board.²² Patton wrote in the letter that it would be "hard luck if owing to the fact he is an M.I. man he could not get this step."²³ Unquestionably, LTC Patton expressed a sentiment that was prevalent in the U.S. Army in the 1920s and 1930s. History does not record whether TSGT Luth retired as a master sergeant. Unfortunately, this sentiment appeared in peacetime exercises and would continue to haunt S-2s on the battlefields of North Africa and Europe.

Patton would turn out to be a tremendous supporter of tactical intelligence in World War II. He practiced what he preached and, Colonel Koch, his 3rd Army G-2 had more leeway than any other G-2 in the ETO. But, General Patton was the exception in the U.S. Army. At the beginning of World War II, this was the condition of tactical intelligence at the battalion and regimental level.

Assumptions

There are several assumptions that form the basis of this thesis. Intelligence is critical to a military organization's success on the battlefield. Comprehensive intelligence support is to mission accomplishment at the battalion and regiment level. A comprehensive, relevant doctrine is vital to the successful planning, collecting, and producing of intelligence. During World War II, operational shortcomings exposed a weakness in intelligence operations and demonstrated the need for an intelligence specialist to perform and maximize the effectiveness of the S-2 position at the tactical level.

Definitions

This thesis employs certain common military terms. The terms include: information, military intelligence, combat intelligence, and reconnaissance. The thesis defines these terms

according to World War II era doctrine, specifically FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence. The thesis employs them in the same manner as an S-2 of that time would have understood the term.

Combat Intelligence. Combat intelligence is military intelligence produced in the field after the outbreak of hostilities, by the military intelligence section of General Headquarters (GHQ) and military intelligence sections of all subordinate units. Usually this class of intelligence is confined to the terrain and location, strength, composition, dispositions, movements, armament, equipment supply, tactics, training, discipline, and morale of the enemy forces opposing a combat unit, and the deductions made from a consideration of those factors.²⁴

Information. All documents, facts, or observations of any kind which may serve to throw light on the enemy or theater of observations constitute information. No information should be neglected. Information which seems unimportant at first glance may, on being compared with that already received, assume primary importance. The value of information is increased when the circumstances concerning its origin, including the time at which it was, are known.²⁵

Military Intelligence. Military intelligence is evaluated and interpreted information concerning a possible or actual enemy, or theater of operations, together with the conclusions drawn therefrom. It includes information concerning enemy capabilities or possible lines of action open to him as well as all that relates to the territory controlled by him or subject to his influence.²⁶

Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain information by visual observation, or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or about the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.²⁷

Limitations

The primary limitation on this study is the lack of published material that directly addresses the intelligence effort below division level at any period in American military history. Indirectly, the subject of the S-2 staff position and the performance of S-2 functions is a

moderately discussed topic in the U.S. Army from the end of World War I to the present. However, the literature is primarily of the "how-to" variety, consisting of limited doctrinal and privately published material.

There are few direct references concerning the actual combat activities of battalion and regimental S-2s and their intelligence efforts. There is much information that discusses the importance of S-2s but very little that addresses the historical reasons and examples of this importance. In World War II, there is no S-2 equivalent of a famous fighter pilot, such as Dick Bong, or an infantryman, such as Audie Murphy. The only American intelligence officer to publish a major work on his activities in World War II, was General Oscar W. Koch, but he addresses primarily intelligence issues no lower than division level. However, he did thank S-2s below division level for their contributions to the G-2 Annex, in the Third Army After-action Report.²⁸ So far as I know, I am doing the first detailed analysis on the combat activities of a particular group of intelligence officers (S-2s).

Delimitation

The thesis focuses on intelligence operations at the battalion and regimental level. The combat operations in North Africa and Europe from November 1942 to May 1945 provide the backdrop to battalion and regimental S-2 operations. U.S. Army operations in these theaters were extensive, and therefore serve as a rich resource for the study of tactical intelligence operations.

North Africa was the U.S. Army's combat proving ground. It was where America's Army moved from the pretend battlefields of the Louisiana Maneuvers to the all too real battlefields of World War II. It was a school house in war, with lessons purchased in blood. The soldiers of the Afrika Korps were superb teachers. However, operations in Europe showed that the soldiers of the U.S. Army were excellent students. They learned much in those deserts. Honed by its Tunisian experience, the U.S. Army spearheaded the assault against Hitler's Europe, and in less than a year after Operation Overlord, defeated the German Wehrmacht.

Certain aspects of these operations are still relevant and continue to influence today's U.S. Army. For example, the operations of Patton's Third Army demonstrate strong similarities to recent U.S. Army operations in Desert Storm. This thesis examines the activities of battalion and regimental S-2s in North Africa and the ETO. For several reasons, tactical intelligence staff operations in these theaters provide an excellent research subject. Research materials and publications are readily available since there is a large body of literature concerning U.S. Army operations in these areas. There are numerous after-action reports prepared by units at all levels. These after-action reports contain in some cases a comprehensive review of intelligence operations.

As mentioned previously, certain aspects of Third Army operations in the ETO bear a remarkable resemblance to U.S. Army operations during Operation Desert Storm. As it advanced across France and Germany, the Third Army faced the difficulties brought on by large numbers of refugees. The refugee population varied in size on a monthly basis. Refugees included escapees from German forced labor camps and civilians fleeing the violence of war. Third Army captured, processed, and held large numbers of enemy prisoners of war (EPW). By March 1945, this became an increasing problem as the Third Reich disintegrated and as the Wehrmacht started to collapse. In Desert Storm this situation was analogous to the Iraqi Army collapse near the end of the so called "Hundred Hour War." The Germans employed flooding as an engineering obstacle in front of the Third Army's axis of advance. The Iraqis set fire to the Kuwaiti oil fields to create a giant fire obstacle to the Coalition's advance.²⁹ During the Gulf War, judging the Iraqi Army's effective strength was at best an inexact science. Fifty years earlier, General Koch, in the G-2 section of the Third Army after-action report, discussed the difficulties of assessing enemy losses on the battlefield.³⁰ During the Gulf War, army intelligence assets focused much of their efforts on Saddam Hussein's perceived center of gravity, the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). Prewar intelligence estimates predicted that the strongest resistance would come from the Republican Guards and their defeat would mean Hussein's downfall. Third Army's G-2

concentrated much of their assets and efforts towards the Waffen Schutzstaffeln (Waffen-SS). The Waffen-SS merited attention as Hitler's personal elite. The Third Army G-2 expected fanatical resistance from Waffen-SS.³¹ The Third Army even experienced its version of a "Scud" hunt. In October 1944, the G-2 "began a diligent search" for German railway artillery.³² The 280 millimeter (mm) railway guns, located near Metz, successfully fired into XX corps rear areas. Other guns located near Nancy fired into Third Army rear areas. Several shells landed near Third Army headquarters.³³ The Third Army G-2 coordinated and directed military intelligence interpreter teams, aerial reconnaissance, corps artillery assets, and forward-deployed units to find the guns. Discovered through intelligence efforts, air and artillery assets destroyed the guns. "Front-line troops" greatly assisted in gathering information on the railway guns.³⁴ This implies the assistance of battalion and regimental S-2s.

The time frame examined is from November 1942 to May 1945 because of the intensity and variety of U.S. Army operations. The U.S. Army conducted an amphibious assault to gain a lodgment area from which to defeat the Third Reich. The Twelfth Army Group, spearheaded by VII Corps, launched Operation Cobra, successfully breaking out of the Normandy Beachhead. Patton's Third Army conducted the Lorraine Campaign. The Seventh Army conducted the invasion of southern France. The Germans launched their counterattacks in the Ardennes. The Allies defeated the counterattack, and shortly afterwards the Rhine River crossings began. Operations concluded two months after the crossings with VE Day. Additionally, U.S. Army operations occurred in Italy throughout this period and provide additional information. Throughout the theater, from November 1942 to May 1945, U.S. Army regiments and their subordinate battalions conducted a variety of operations. A single regiment or battalion, serving throughout this period, would participate in offensive operations, such as pursuits, river crossings, and amphibious assaults. Units would participate in defensive operations, such as retreats, and the occasional rout (106th Infantry Division). This thesis will encompass many types of tactical operations and the support provided by the intelligence officer. The operations in the North

Africa and the ETO provide an excellent and relevant framework in which to examine tactical intelligence operations.

Significance of the Study

The U. S. Army lacks a detailed historical analysis of intelligence operations conducted by S-2s during World War II or in any conflict in the Twentieth century. Yet, in the current force, battalion and brigade intelligence operations as directed by a trained intelligence specialist, the S-2, are indispensable to today's commander. The S-2 role and function serve as a cornerstone to the Military Intelligence Corps. The S-2 and his section are the one tangible intelligence asset that a combat Arms commander can employ. The S-2 section serves as his conduit to higher level intelligence organizations and assets. Military Intelligence officers must serve a tour as an S-2 for branch qualification.

Today, the reasons for this are clear. The S-2 is a credible and necessary part of the commander's tactical decision-making process. Training, doctrine, and extensive assets, focused strictly on intelligence gathering, support the S-2 in performing his tasks. Also, the recognition of his important role in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield contributes to this support. Through the fusion of this support, he reduces battlefield uncertainty and allows his commander to make a more measured assessment of risk. The knowledge of an S-2 can conceivably increase the combat power of his unit. This was not always the case. There is not a historical context for this now respected duty in the U.S. Army. This thesis will provide at least some of that context and perhaps provide relevant lessons to today's S-2.

CHAPTER 2

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE U.S. ARMY'S TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, 1936-1942

By the beginning of World War II, the U.S. Army had defined the role of the tactical intelligence officer at battalion and regimental level. Against the backdrop of the tactical intelligence officer's low standing in the field, the U.S. Army recognized the importance of tactical intelligence and formulated substantial intelligence doctrine based on its World War I experience. It placed the responsibility for the success of the intelligence effort on the commander. As a result, the S-2 played a critical role in the commander's operational decisions as the commander's advisor on intelligence. In recognition of the S-2's significance in the decision-making process, the U.S. Army developed extensive lectures on the "intelligence function" at Command and General Staff School in the interwar years.³⁵ Training literature noted the pervasive role that S-2s would play in all missions of a combat battalion. Some literature suggested that the role of the S-2 required the creation of a new branch. The U.S. Army emphasized in its field manuals that officers and enlisted men selected for an S-2 assignment had to be of highest caliber. The field manuals describing infantry and armor operations before 1943 noted in detail the functions of the S-2 within the line battalions and regiments. The officers assigned to the S-2 position entering World War II had a well-established doctrinal blueprint for intelligence operations to guide their efforts.

The U.S. Army doctrine, training literature, and prewar training exercises emphasized that intelligence was the tactical commander's responsibility. Field Manual 30-5, Combat Intelligence (1940), stated that it was "the basic function of command to initiate and coordinate the search for

the necessary information.”³⁶ All field manuals that mentioned the subject of tactical intelligence parroted this statement. This was more than simply the old saw that the commander was responsible for everything that his unit did or failed to do. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1941), noted that the commander was “responsible for all intelligence activities of his unit.”³⁷ This included the activities of his S-2 and the intelligence section. Doctrine required the commander to seek intelligence from all possible sources including sister units, higher echelons, and subordinate units.³⁸ Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Walter R. Wheeler, an infantry officer who instructed at Command and General Staff School (CGSS) in the 1930s, commented about the commander’s intelligence function in his book The Infantry Battalion in War. He noted that the battalion commander “must keep his company and attached unit commanders, the regimental commander, and adjacent unit commanders regularly informed of events as he knows them.”³⁹

The emphasis that military intelligence was a commander’s responsibility was not an accidental burden. The U.S. Army understood that in order for the commander to make an operational decision, he needed firm military intelligence. The commander required intelligence that accurately described his situation in relation to the enemy. Colonel Edwin E. Schwiien was an infantry officer who prepared military intelligence lectures for the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Also, he taught military intelligence and history at the school in the 1930s. He noted in his book Combat Intelligence, which he based on Command and General Staff College lectures, that “information of the enemy forms the base for all intelligent decisions” and that it is “the most important factor in the commander’s decision.”⁴⁰ Clearly, the U.S. Army realized that for the commander to make an effective decision he needed effective intelligence. Instructors at the Command and General Staff College designed intelligence practical exercises to demonstrate the great difficulty of attempting to maneuver with extremely limited intelligence about the enemy and his intentions.⁴¹ In the 1930s and early 1940s, the future commanders in World War II learned during training and through doctrine that intelligence was a command responsibility and crucial to their decision-making process.

Naturally, the commander could not perform the intelligence function by himself. According to doctrine and professional literature, the S-2 acted as the primary advisor to the commander on intelligence matters. The S-2 was responsible for the production of military intelligence and for the intelligence training of every soldier in his battalion or regiment including his own section. To fulfill those missions, the S-2 performed a number of functions and required and received a number of assets. The functions included collecting, organizing, and analyzing information in the process of producing military intelligence. In the sphere of doctrine, the U.S. Army understood the value of the intelligence section within tactical units. Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler noted that the "work of the battalion intelligence personnel forms the basis of all combat intelligence."⁴² The importance of the S-2 in the operations of an infantry battalion was seen in Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler's book. In The Infantry Battalion at War, the S-2 played a vital role in every type of battalion operation. The book demonstrated that the commander required the involvement of the S-2 by describing the intelligence officer's role in many missions like during the approach march, moving to the line of departure, repelling a counter attack, and using the battalion as a holding force.

Doctrine established that the commander was responsible for the intelligence function and that the S-2 was the key player for the successful application of intelligence. Because of the vital role of the S-2 in the commander's decision-making process, it was important that only quality officers held that position. Doctrine as described in FM 30-5 defined the qualities expected in an officer headed for the S-2 position. The officer needed a solid military background. It noted that the S-2 had to understand all aspects about his battalion or regiment including its organization, tactics, and logistics. The prospective S-2 needed to be an expert on the enemy and his tactics, equipment, and organization. The S-2 needed "a thorough grounding in all military intelligence matters" and "should be the best qualified officer available."⁴³ Clearly, the U.S. Army felt individuals of the highest caliber should serve in the G-2 and S-2 positions. General Heintzelman, a one time commandant of the Command and General Staff School, stated that in

wartime, he would select the “best man” for his G-2.⁴⁴ Colonel Schwien summed up the importance of the S-2 position when he noted that “no green second lieutenant is suitable for this type of work” since the battalion S-2 “must be as well qualified as the general staff officer serving as division G-2.”⁴⁵ The U.S. Army learned this lesson by the “bitter and costly experiences of our assault battalions” in World War I.⁴⁶ Colonel Schwien was a prophetic individual. The U.S. Army needed a sound doctrine to support the S-2 and the tactical intelligence effort.

Colonel Schwien’s CGSS lectures and his book Combat Intelligence probably formed the basis of FM 30-5. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine some influences that shaped Colonel Schwien’s ideas. The result of these influences affected the way the S-2s in North Africa and Europe fought in the war.

Colonel Schwien gained many lessons from the French tactical intelligence system as employed in World War I. In this regard, he bucked the trend of British influence on U.S. Army intelligence operations. The British are credited with providing the initial intelligence training that U.S. soldiers received in World War I and II. Colonel Schwien, in the forward of his book, thanked French Colonel Bernis for his “very excellent essay on military intelligence” from which he “freely borrowed” to write Combat Intelligence.⁴⁷ Colonel Bernis drew from the intelligence experiences of the French and German armies in World War I.

Drawing heavily on the French tactical intelligence experience, Colonel Schwien cites numerous case studies that describe intelligence failures in French and German efforts in identification of enemy capabilities, collection of information, and in its dissemination. These are terms that appeared in FM 30-5 and in CGSS lectures. For example, he noted the G-2 of the French IV Corps failed to determine essential elements of information and, then, to produce a collection plan prior to mounting an attack in the Ardennes against the Germans in August 1914. Superior German forces surprised and promptly defeated the IV Corps. The IV Corps suffered this severe defeat because its G-2 failed to observe simple intelligence procedures. The S-2 in World War II would know the necessity of determining essential elements of information and the

development of a collection plan to direct his intelligence efforts as described in Colonel Schwien's IV Corps example.⁴⁸

Apparently, Colonel Schwien correctly anticipated that the next war would be one of maneuver. All his case studies revolve around actions in 1914 and in 1918 when the opposing forces experienced a degree of maneuver. Also, his examples focus on maneuver scenarios, in which an intelligence officer must react to, and keep up with, a rapidly changing situation.

He does not provide his vision of future war, but he realized that modern weapons created the "void of the battlefield."⁴⁹ The range and effectiveness of modern weapons greatly narrowed the commander's view of the battlefield. Gone were the days when a commander chose a piece of high ground to observe several armies locked in battle. In modern war, a battalion commander could not observe his own battalion, much less an enemy battalion to his front. Consequently, as Colonel Schwien pointed out, tactical intelligence was necessary to produce the battlefield picture. In turn, the intelligence officer was critical to the commander's ability to make a battlefield decision. Thus, the S-2 entered the war with a doctrine designed with an eye to the future and not mired in the trenches of the last war.

The U.S. Army viewed the intelligence officer's success in gathering combat intelligence as vital to the accomplishment of the battalion's combat mission and in minimizing casualties. Field Manual 30-5 served as the intelligence officer's primary guide in those critical roles and was the centerpiece of intelligence doctrine prior to World War II. Although not written specifically for the S-2, this document served as the primary doctrinal source for tactical intelligence officers throughout the war with only one major change and three minor administrative changes. It would remain the basic, doctrinal, intelligence manual until the late seventies. It was a product of World War I experience and largely agreed with the training material on intelligence produced at Command and General Staff School in the late 1930s.

The scope of FM 30-5 was both simple and broad. It provided the parameters on military intelligence in an active theater of operations. It was the guide for the "organization, training, and

employment of intelligence personnel of all combat units.”⁵⁰ It covered the duties of all intelligence personnel, whether in a G-2 position or in charge of an interrogation team, from the War Department General Staff down to the battalion level.

Field Manual 30-5 had an important flaw concerning the tactical intelligence officer. It aimed too high. Serving as the all-encompassing document on military intelligence for the U.S. Army, its discussions were probably more appropriate to the G-2 rather than the S-2. However, in describing FM 30-5’s application in the field, it noted that the term “G-2” was to be “interpreted to include the intelligence officer or S-2 of all lower units.”⁵¹ Because of its importance in defining the theoretical role and functions of the S-2 during world War II, it is necessary to closely examine its contents.

Field Manual 30-5 explained the process and procedures that intelligence officers employed to produce military intelligence. It described a series of functions that an intelligence officer accomplished in that process. In cookbook fashion, it stated that an intelligence officer collected information, organized it, conducted an evaluation and then an interpretation, followed by a formal estimate, with the process ending with dissemination.

At the start of the process, the S-2 collected information. Information was the rawest form of intelligence and normally came from his front-line companies. The first part of the information collection was to determine “enemy capabilities.”⁵² In order for the commander to make decisions in regard to his mission, he needed to know the capability of the enemy. The term “enemy,” as used in FM 30-5, meant the consideration of his tactics, dispositions, activities, strength, organization and equipment.⁵³ A capability essentially was an enemy course of action. The S-2 judged an enemy’s capability by its effect on the accomplishment of the commander’s mission.

The term “capability” replaced “probable intentions” in doctrine in 1932 after considerable debate.⁵⁴ A probable intention focused on one likely enemy course of action, whereas capabilities reviewed all possible options open to an enemy commander that could

disrupt a friendly commander's plan. The U.S. Army recognized that narrowing an enemy's options with "precision" down to one likely course of action in battle was not reasonable.⁵⁵ This was a realistic view of the limitations of intelligence at this time and indicated that the authors of doctrine closely examined intelligence issues prior to the war. The issue of predicting an enemy's intentions with precision would surface again during World War II.

An enemy's capability encompassed several possibilities. At its simplest level, as an example, it was the S-2 trying to determine if the enemy had the capability to attack or defend. However, commanders rarely based operational decisions on such general knowledge. The S-2 had to determine how the terrain and weather affected the enemy's capability to attack or defend. Still, the availability of intelligence in the 1930s and 1940s (and for that matter in the 1990s) did not present such a clear picture of the battlefield that the S-2 could reduce the capabilities of an enemy unit down to two courses of action. The S-2 considered and presented to his commander every enemy capability that he could not eliminate based on the available intelligence. An enemy's equipment and morale could factor into a capability. Therefore, an S-2 would brief the commander that the enemy had the ability to attack. If the enemy chose to attack, he could strike the friendly unit in the right flank or left flank, with or without air and artillery support. He would break down the enemy's capability to defend in the same fashion. Theoretically, this would provide the commander with ample information on which to base or pursue a decision. Naturally, after presenting the commander these numerous options, the S-2 continually refined the list of enemy capabilities in an attempt to determine the enemy's actual course of action.⁵⁶

In order to determine a capability, the S-2 needed to collect information. In order to collect information, the S-2 needed to focus his collection efforts on what supported his commander's mission and decisions. The commander focused the S-2 and his collection efforts by designating essential elements of information. Essential elements of information were any data about the enemy including questions about his capabilities, terrain not occupied by friendly forces, and the weather or "meteorological conditions" that a commander required to make a

“sound” decision in order to successfully execute his mission.⁵⁷ The S-2 normally produced the essential elements of information for the commander's approval. The number of essential elements of information was limited only by the thinking process of the S-2 and his commander's requirements.

“Collecting agencies” were sources of information that an intelligence officer could draw on to produce military intelligence.⁵⁸ They were any unit within an intelligence officer's sphere of influence. They included external assets, such as a radio interception company. They included internal assets, such as the battalion scout. Also, they represented a process, such as the interrogation of a prisoner of war or the examination of captured documents.

The intelligence plan was the intelligence officer's tool to focus the collection agency on the essential elements of information in the process of developing finished military intelligence.⁵⁹ Through this document the S-2 tasked specific subordinate units to collect the essential elements of information. The intelligence plan determined when to collect the required data.

Next, the S-2 organized and recorded this information, in a process defined as “collation.”⁶⁰ This process separated collected information into different categories. Its purpose was to track incoming intelligence in an organized fashion. The final product, probably an estimate of the situation or a periodic report, came from collation. The S-2 recorded incoming information chronologically into an S-2 journal. The S-2 worksheet categorized the information by topic or category, regardless of chronology. The worksheet could serve as an outline to a periodic report.

After gathering and organizing the information, the S-2 conducted an analysis and produced combat intelligence that essentially dealt with the information on enemy dispositions and equipment and the terrain on which the S-2's unit executed operations. This process was known as the evaluation and interpretation of information. The goal was to send intelligence that was “concise” and free of trivia to the user. The S-2 could not simply transmit all information he

received from his collection agencies.⁶¹ This process transformed information into military intelligence.

Evaluation was the first step in this process. The S-2 decided if the information was credible and useful. This was to determine the information's "value" as intelligence.⁶² The next step was interpretation. The S-2 determined the meaning of the information he had collected, organized and evaluated during the intelligence process. After using deduction and reasoning, and comparing the information to other available intelligence, the S-2 drew a conclusion.⁶³ Now the S-2 had a military intelligence product or combat intelligence that potentially was of value to the G-2. The battalion S-2's proximity to the front-line made the actual production of military intelligence difficult. However, the battalion was the first level at which an intelligence officer formally evaluated information to determine its Usefulness. The S-2 was now ready to release a product.

The S-2 produced the estimate, a product whose ultimate purpose was to assist the commander in making decisions and reducing battlefield uncertainties. It was not always a product of the preceding process because the S-2 wrote the estimate as circumstances and the commander required. It was a short summation of the current enemy situation and likely enemy courses of action.⁶⁴

Lastly, the S-2 disseminated military intelligence. The flow of information between division, regimental, and battalion intelligence officers was the key to applying the doctrinal tenets of FM 30-5. It was critical to the success of S-2s providing intelligence to commanders at all levels for making operational decisions. Speedy dissemination was the goal. The S-2 accomplished dissemination through several different methods. The S-2 could present intelligence in person. For example, he could go to a company commander most affected by recent information. If a visit to the front-lines was not convenient, intelligence officers at all levels could produce a periodic report summarizing the current situation.⁶⁵ If the information was extremely perishable or of considerable interest, such as the discovery of a new weapon, the battalion S-2

could issue a special report on the matter. Doctrinally, dissemination was the final step in the process of producing military intelligence.

The intelligence chain within the division fed the FM 30-5 functions that led to military intelligence. Starting from the bottom and following doctrinal expectations, the battalion S-2 would feed information or combat intelligence to the regimental S-2. Intelligence doctrine assumed and prewar practice demonstrated that the majority of the battalion S-2's intelligence products came from patrol results and observation posts. The U.S. Army expected little analysis of information at the battalion level beyond ensuring the data was valid.

The regimental S-2 received the information or combat intelligence from the battalion S-2. The U.S. Army perceived that the regimental S-2 had a little more time for analysis; however, he did not always have the time to produce finished military intelligence. The majority of his information would come from the subordinate battalions, the regimental intelligence platoon, and regimental observation posts.

The regimental S-2 passed the collected combat intelligence to the G-2. The G-2 relayed whatever he obtained from corps and other divisional units back down to the regimental S-2 and then to the battalion S-2. The G-2 was the first level of serious analysis of collected intelligence. The G-2 relied on the patrols and observation posts from subordinate battalions and regiments and on the information gathering capabilities of attached units, such as air defense units and the artillery.⁶⁶

This seemingly simple process was facilitated in primarily two ways. The intelligence officer could send the information up the intelligence chain through radio communications. Every intelligence section was authorized a radio. The other method was through messengers. The regimental S-2 had messengers in his section. Using organic transport assets, borrowed in the case of the battalion S-2s, intelligence officers could arrange delivery of information through messengers.

To fulfill the functions as found in FM 30-5 and to assist the information flow within the division, organic assets supported the tactical intelligence officer at both the battalion and the regimental level. Additionally, the division G-2 provided some support with military intelligence detachments from corps or a numbered army. The infantry battalion S-2 had two organic assets. First, he could, in theory, directly task front-line companies to perform patrols to gather information which, when collected on the battlefield, became combat intelligence. Doctrine recommended that the S-2 coordinate any tasking with the battalion S-3 (which was sound advice). Secondly, he directed and trained the S-2 section that was organic to the battalion. The infantry battalion intelligence section was authorized a first lieutenant as an S-2 and a staff sergeant whose specialty was topographical draftsman and who acted as the section's non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC).⁶⁷ The section included six trained scouts with the rank of private.⁶⁸ The scouts were trained reconnaissance specialists and observers. The S-2 sparingly employed scouts on routine patrols. When on patrols, they were not to engage enemy forces, as that disrupted the intelligence gathering mission. Also, each line company had six trained scouts, for a total of eighteen scouts besides the S-2 section, although their doctrinal employment was unclear.

The U.S. Army considered scouts vital to the combat intelligence effort far beyond battalion level. Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler stated that "to a large extent, the plans and orders of higher commanders are based upon the military intelligence resulting, primarily, from the activities of battalion scouts and observers."⁶⁹ This included the division G-2. However, the enlisted personnel of the Battalion S-2 section helped man the command post and maintain situation maps, detracting from their ability to scout.

Another weakness was that the infantry battalion S-2 section did not have any transport. In World War II, after-action reports pointed out that S-2s spent too much time at the command post. This limited his situational awareness. It implied timidity. Also, an S-2 could not effectively perform his mission from the confines of a tent. Then again, on the mechanized

battlefields of Tunisia and Europe, it was hard to get the front to accomplish reconnaissance, no matter how fast an S-2 could run, without transport.

Lastly, according to doctrine, the battalion S-2 could rely on intelligence support from the regimental S-2. This included providing support from the I&R platoon.

The U.S. Army did not authorize the armor battalion a dedicated battalion S-2 officer or section before the start of the war. An armor battalion received one major to perform the duties of the S-2 and S-3.⁷⁰ How this worked is unknown; however, that officer's priority of effort probably rested in the operations section. Perhaps the tight prewar budget dictated that the armor battalion would not have an intelligence section. The relative newness of armor doctrine may have also played a role. By 1942, the armor battalion had a dedicated S-2 and the 17 series (armor operations) field manuals reflected this position.

However, the original tables of organization authorized the armor battalion a reconnaissance platoon.⁷¹ The platoon leader was a first lieutenant and had twenty-one enlisted personnel including a staff sergeant as platoon sergeant.⁷² Twelve of these soldiers were reconnaissance experts.⁷³ The tables of organization authorized the platoon one half-track, two motorcycles, and four jeeps.⁷⁴ The platoon's mission was to collect information and relay it quickly to the commander.⁷⁵ The platoon conducted a zone reconnaissance in front of the battalion as it advanced, or it searched designated terrain in an area reconnaissance mission.⁷⁶ The platoon also conducted route reconnaissance, provided flank security, and helped operate the command post. It is possible the reconnaissance platoon leader had the additional duty of S-2, but the practice if it existed probably varied widely between battalions.

The infantry regiment S-2's primary asset was the I&R platoon. The intelligence and reconnaissance platoon was the regimental commander's primary intelligence gathering agency.⁷⁷ Initially in 1940, the regimental S-2 commanded the platoon in addition to his S-2 duties.⁷⁸ After the U.S. Army General Headquarters Maneuvers of 1941, the platoon was authorized a first lieutenant platoon leader.⁷⁹ The S-2 could directly task this platoon, as could the S-3 and

regimental commander. A technical sergeant was the platoon noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) with two squads of enlisted soldiers each led by a staff sergeant. The staff sergeants held the specialty of trained draftsmen. The platoon's strength totaled eighteen personnel.⁸⁰ By World War II, the platoon operated eight jeeps.⁸¹ The platoon manned observation posts, executed specialized patrols, and assisted in command post operations.

The armor regiment S-2 relied on the reconnaissance intelligence platoon for regimental intelligence operations. The tables of organization provided the same number and type of vehicles as found in the armor battalion reconnaissance platoon. It had a similar mission to the armor battalion's reconnaissance platoon. However, the reconnaissance intelligence platoon had twenty-two enlisted personnel. It had nine reconnaissance experts and one intelligence specialist in the platoon.⁸²

The U.S. Army implied through the doctrine and prewar training literature, that the S-2 would have the benefit of intelligence gathered by outside agencies. The S-2 planned for intelligence from aerial reconnaissance. The S-2 expected and sought the assistance of the division G-2 in the gathering and production of combat intelligence. The battalion and regimental S-2s planned for and counted on the passing of intelligence from adjacent units. The G-2 arranged for the employment of a number of specialized intelligence teams, such as order of battle teams, photo interpreter teams, and interrogators. The G-2 coordinated the employment of air assets to assist his collection and that of the S-2s.

Field Manual 30-5 provided the U.S. Army with the doctrinal foundation for the collection, analysis, and production of intelligence. The intelligence sections within a division received a number of assets to execute those functions as found in FM 30-5. The training of intelligence personnel was the next piece in the functioning and maintenance of a tactical intelligence system within the division. As found in FM 30-5, the basis of military intelligence training was a laundry list of instruction subjects for all intelligence personnel at every echelon in the U.S. Army. The list required that intelligence personnel receive instruction on "collection,

recording, evaluation, and interpretation of the enemy and terrain, in the dissemination of military intelligence," and operational security and antipropaganda measures.⁸³

Guided by these principles, the U.S. Army assigned training responsibility. There was no formal intelligence school. The commander had ultimate responsibility for ensuring all soldiers under his command knew their intelligence responsibilities. At each level of command, the intelligence officer assisted the commander in preparing intelligence training and was responsible for training the personnel of subordinate units.⁸⁴ The G-2 trained both regimental and battalion S-2s as well as members of their own sections. The regimental S-2 trained battalion S-2s, the I&R platoon, and the regimental intelligence section. The battalion S-2 was responsible for his section and the training of all members in the battalion for patrolling duties.⁸⁵

Field Manual 30-5 provided the course curriculum for regimental and divisional intelligence schools. Both officers and enlisted men attended the schools. There was not any specialized training specifically for the S-2. There was not a prescribed length of time for the school or its frequency. Colonel Schwien recommended that the U.S. Army create a formal intelligence school that would train junior officers as intelligence specialists.⁸⁶ The U.S. Army would wait until the sixties to follow his recommendation.

Field Manual 30-5 recommended that the regimental intelligence school provide instruction about the organization of the division intelligence system, camouflage, reports, captured documents, basic tactics, observation, and patrolling techniques.⁸⁷ At the regimental level, the emphasis was on patrolling techniques.

The division school provided instruction on roughly the same topics as the regimental school. However, it apparently provided more detailed instruction or at least more complicated titles for the courses. Patrolling was still important, but was referred to as "ground reconnaissance."⁸⁸ According to doctrine, the division school covered in depth outside intelligence agencies, such as signal intelligence, artillery intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance.⁸⁹

Comparing the curriculums of the two schools as written in FM 30-5, the division school appeared to provide a more comprehensive level of instruction than the regimental school. On the surface this makes sense as the division would have more assets and experienced personnel than subordinate units for operating a school. In practice, this was not the case. Command and General Staff College instruction before World War II did not agree with doctrine on the topic of division intelligence schools. In 1935, Colonel Schwien taught a course called the Detailed Operation of a G-2 Section in a Division.⁹⁰ The course described the operations of a G-2 section during a division training exercise. In this setting, the G-2 negotiated with the division chief of staff to obtain training time for a division intelligence school before the start of the exercise. He wanted to assemble the battalion and regimental S-2s of the division for training in order to "get them lined up on G-2 work."⁹¹ The G-2 wanted to train all the intelligence platoons but acknowledged that the S-2s after the division school could handle their training.⁹² The G-2s recommended training curriculum consist of map reading, panoramic sketching, photo interpretation, observation techniques, patrolling techniques, aircraft identification, handling of captured personnel and documents, and instruction on enemy tactics and organization.⁹³ The G-2 realized that the training would be "sketchy."⁹⁴ The chief of staff agreed to the school and granted "five afternoons a week for two weeks," with sessions lasting approximately an hour.⁹⁵ The G-2 anticipated that the division school would influence and help the regimental schools.⁹⁶

Conclusions about the training of the tactical intelligence officers before World war II can be drawn from this course of instruction. First, the U.S. Army tended to view the S-2 position as a duty that was relatively easy to master. This was in contradiction to the established and fairly comprehensive doctrine and the prewar training literature concerning the key role the S-2 played in the many missions of a combat battalion. Second, intelligence training for the average S-2 in a division was extremely basic and implied that the S-2 was little more than a patrol leader. Third, the quality of training probably varied greatly from division to division depending on how the G-2 developed the curriculum. Fourth, the operation of an intelligence school depended greatly on the

personality of the G-2 and the desires of the division chief of staff and division commander. And fifth, the division and regimental school system for intelligence training, which occurred on an irregular basis with varying curriculums, probably provided uneven training for the average S-2 and did not greatly increase the efficiency of the division intelligence system for the U.S. Army.

While battalion and regimental S-2s experienced erratic training in the division schools, the U.S. Army recognized that the position of division intelligence officer (G-2) required comprehensive training. The curriculum of the Command and General Staff College reflected this idea. In 1940 the school was organized into sections along "G-staff lines" and included a teaching department named the G-2 section.⁹⁷ This was a special course attended by officers destined to be G-2s in their next assignment. The course of instruction on military intelligence from 1935 to 1941 varied in length from 17 hours to 25 hours. However, the lectures covered in detail the operations of the U.S. Army's intelligence system and the workings of a division G-2 section. The instruction followed topics found in the training principles of FM 30-5. Additionally, students worked through a series of practical exercises involving historical examples of battles lost over a commander's failure to properly seek or utilize intelligence in his decision-making process. The majority of examples included the experiences of French and German commanders in 1914 and American commanders in 1918. Some lessons went as far back as Waterloo, in which Colonel Schwien blamed Grouchy's failure on intelligence and then proceeded to demonstrate how Grouchy could have reversed the course of history if only he had had a well-trained G-2.⁹⁸ In each case study, the intelligence failure was preventable and the results of that failure were severe casualties and defeat. The lesson was the G-2 was crucial to "active operations" and the commander needed to rely on him.⁹⁹

The members attending Command and General Staff School in this period were the future battalion, regimental, and division commanders as well as future G-2s on the battlefields of World War II. They would have benefited from their battalion and regimental S-2s undergoing structured, regularly scheduled training on current intelligence operations that incorporated

historically based practical exercises on intelligence as found at the Command and General Staff School. Perhaps the casualty lists in World War II would have been shorter with a trained corps of intelligence specialists as S-2s. Field Manual 30-5, when discussing General Headquarters intelligence school, noted that the "success of the intelligence service as a whole will depend upon in large measure upon the selection of suitable personnel and their proper training."¹⁰⁰

Unfortunately this rule was not applied at the lowest levels where initial contact with the enemy first occurred. At a minimum, the quality of intelligence training at the regimental and battalion was uneven and in some cases, probably a waste of time.

Entering World War II and prior to the commencement of the North African campaign, the U.S. Army appeared to have a comprehensive tactical intelligence doctrine supporting the division and below intelligence operations. Field Manual 30-5 served as the U.S. Army's intelligence bible. At the G-2 level, the U.S. Army conducted intelligence training according to doctrine in a structured manner based on the World War I experience. At the S-2 level in battalions and regiments, again the doctrine appeared to be comprehensive. The S-2 role was defined or referenced in the field manuals for combat arms battalions. The S-2 role was defined in FM 101-5 and discussed in great detail in FM 7-25. However, intelligence training at this level appeared haphazard and probably varied greatly from unit to unit. Although recognized in doctrine as vital to the commander's success in decision-making, out in the field, the S-2 position was not popular. In exercises like the Louisiana Maneuvers, commanders poorly utilized or ignored the S-2. Officers viewed duty as an S-2 as detrimental to their career. In practice, there were problems for the serving S-2. In theory, the S-2 was ready for war.

CHAPTER 3

CROSSING THE BRIDGE BETWEEN THEORY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF COMBAT: TUNISIA, 1942-1943

The lessons learned during the Tunisian campaign did not cause any change in intelligence doctrine. The North African experience validated the doctrinal design of intelligence operations as described in FM 30-5 Combat Intelligence. The battlefield highlighted what would become the S-2's primary duties in the ETO. It focused attention on the collection of information, its collation and interpretation, and ultimately, its dissemination as military intelligence. Weaknesses in all these areas became apparent during S-2 operations at the tactical level and indicated that regimental and division intelligence training was inadequate. Also, the poor prewar standing of the S-2 adversely affected combat intelligence operations in Tunisia. Additionally, the end of operations saw an outpouring of training materials and professional literature that validated the U.S. Army's intelligence doctrine. Finally, the first employment of specialized intelligence teams in support of tactical operations occurred in Tunisia. The S-2 serving in the ETO would carry the lessons of North Africa to the battlefields of France and Germany.

Since the Tunisian campaign greatly influenced the American army that fought in the ETO in 1944-45, it is necessary to briefly summarize the key events. The U.S. Army performed reasonably well in the Torch landings, overcoming limited French opposition in taking Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. The landings exposed training shortcomings in a relatively benign operational environment. However, beginning in December 1942, this campaign saw the first large scale employment of American units against the German army. As a U.S. Army general noted, the "results were not calculated to fill American hearts with pride."¹⁰¹ The 1st U.S.

Armored Division suffered severely at the hands of Rommel's experienced veterans. At Kasserine Pass, it lost 1,400 men in nine days of action and an additional 4,000 men lost as prisoners.¹⁰² The division lost heavily in tanks, artillery, support vehicles, and material. The effect of Kasserine on the American army was described as "traumatic."¹⁰³ However, Kasserine and the North Africa campaign as a whole served as a "catalyst" for operational improvement as the U.S. Army quickly bounced back.¹⁰⁴ By the end of the campaign, the U.S. Army was more than a match for the Germans. Tunisia served as an archive of lessons learned for future operations against the Wehrmacht, influenced intelligence training, and defined the critical functions of the battalion and regimental S-2s serving in the ETO in 1944.

The desert battlefields placed a microscope on the S-2's functions and the tactical intelligence system. The S-2 did not gain any new functions as a result of the North Africa campaign. Instead, the expectations of combat commanders grew in terms of what they felt the S-2 should offer in contributing to the success of any operation. The organization of the S-2 section as diagrammed in the TOEs of the time did not change after Tunisia. Also, it confirmed the basic structure of the tactical intelligence within the division.

Speaking in broad terms, combat reaffirmed the vital role that intelligence would play in a commander's estimate of the situation or an operational decision. The purpose of combat intelligence remained to reduce battlefield uncertainty before the commander made his operational decision. Battle experience made it apparent that the S-2 was the primary staff officer in reducing the fog of war.

Doctrine noted that the intelligence process began with the gathering of information. Also, it anticipated that this would be a difficult process in combat, since the enemy would try to deny this information.¹⁰⁵ The Germans excelled at counter surveillance and camouflage. One American commanding officer, fresh his Kasserine experience, wearily noted that it was "hard to believe they hide a gun as well as they do."¹⁰⁶

To gather this information, the S-2 could turn to many collection agencies. There were patrolling and operating observation posts which the S-2's unit conducted. There were sister battalions and regiments, and of course, the division. Even the air force could provide the S-2 with information, through aerial reconnaissance. The availability of these sources of information was of no surprise to U.S. Army doctrine writers. However, their employment and management by S-2s were less than efficient during battle.

In North Africa, the battalion and regimental S-2 collated data through journals and by keeping the situation map updated. He evaluated the data for its Usefulness. It appears that the S-2 tended to exaggerate the size and capabilities of the enemy during the evaluation process in Tunisia. This is something he shares in common with today's S-2. However, the exaggerations were probably a result of inexperience and his inadequate training. The S-2 interpreted the data and produced intelligence summaries. At least in performing their duties, the S-2s followed the doctrinal outline of their functions.

Besides the penchant for exaggeration, the S-2 seemed to have a problem with rapidly disseminating his product. The process of dissemination was a key intelligence function according to doctrine. Again, the problems with dissemination resulted from a mixture of inexperience, first time combat, and poor training.

Then there was the issue of intelligence training. The S-2 received the lion's share of the blame for the poor state of patrolling and the unreadiness of the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon. In terms of doctrine, this was a fair criticism. The S-2 was responsible for training the battalion and regiment for patrolling, observation post duties, and the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon. However, prior to the war, commanders rarely afforded the S-2 opportunity to exercise those functions. Also, his personal training to gather, collate, interpret and disseminate combat intelligence was probably inadequate. The S-2 continued his occasional training at regimental and division schools.

So in the broadest sense, the roles and functions of the S-2 did not undergo any changes. However, it is Useful to examine some specific functions that served as the foundations to that general conclusion.

In North Africa, the U.S. Army criticized the S-2's attempts at the collection of information. The gathering of information was the first step in producing military intelligence. In order to gather or collect information, the S-2 had several collection agencies at his disposal. Field Manual 30-5, pamphlets, and training materials described the collection agencies available as sources of intelligence to the battalion and regiment S-2. "Collecting agency" was the term that FM 30-5 applied to any source of intelligence.¹⁰⁷

"Observation posts, patrols and personnel reconnaissance" were the primary collecting agencies for the battalion S-2.¹⁰⁸ However, other agencies or sources included "artillery liaison officer(when attached), the regimental S-2, other Bn S-2s, and the units on either flank."¹⁰⁹

The regimental S-2 depended upon his subordinate battalions, the G-2, fellow regimental S-2s, the artillery S-2, the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, his observation posts, "attached units, such as engineers" and the "antitank net" as collection agencies or sources of intelligence.¹¹⁰ "Too often overlooked," the aid station for friendly wounded was a recommended source for intelligence.¹¹¹

The effectiveness of patrols was a concern in Tunisia. Patrolling as defined in FM 30-5, provided the commander his primary method to collect information.¹¹² At some point, division would convert it into combat or military intelligence.¹¹³

The key to tactical intelligence collection was patrolling. Patrolling was the foundation of combat intelligence in a division.¹¹⁴ The G-2 relied on front-line patrolling more than any other single available G-2 asset, to produce his summaries and recommend courses of actions to the division commander. The key to patrolling was the regimental and battalion S-2.

The G-2 received patrol reports through the intelligence reporting chain that started at the lowest level with the S-2. Taken a step further, the G-2 of a corps depended on the reports from

division G-2s. So the availability of a trained, intelligence specialist at the tactical level would have greatly enhanced intelligence gathering in the divisions and potentially saved many lives. Combat in Tunisia demonstrated that the U.S. Army was not fully applying its doctrine. The field manuals, such as FM 30-5 and FM 7-25, anticipated the lessons learned during the Torch landings and at Kasserine Pass. Also, the Louisiana Maneuvers previewed several of these issues.

Most field manuals, professional literature, and training materials of the period, realized the importance of patrolling to gather information for the S-2 and the front-line battalions and regiments. Combat action in Tunisia brought this out as an issue. The battalion S-2 bore most of responsibility for patrolling. The battalion S-2 was the key player for patrol information in a combat division. The S-2 had to know, "what information is desired and be able to brief his project thoroughly."¹¹⁵

One of the S-2's primary functions was to train battalion and regimental personnel in patrolling methods. The U.S. Army emphasized that intelligence personnel would "have to do it themselves" when referring to participating on patrols as a way of enhancing their abilities to train unit soldiers for patrolling.¹¹⁶ In the ETO in 1944, S-2 personnel routinely accompanied patrols. The emphasis on patrolling as a primary function for the S-2 increased throughout the war.

The U.S. Army's front-line units provided the personnel and equipment for patrolling. The S-2 was responsible for their pre-mission and post-mission briefings. The S-2 had to provide detailed mission briefs to the patrol leader. The more detailed the mission brief the more chance of success for the patrol.

In Tunisia, patrolling by American forces was poor. The U.S. Army placed significant blame on the S-2 for this weak combat debut. The U.S. Army devised many techniques to improve the quality of patrolling in American combat divisions. It implied that it was incumbent upon the S-2 to make patrolling successful in his unit. It recommended several techniques for the tactical S-2 to improve patrolling. The best time to perform a patrol was at night. The enemy was less alert at night, and darkness provided the advantage of concealment. Influenced by the British

experience, S-2s learned the value of prisoner snatches during patrolling. An S-2 was to consider employing artillery in co-operation with patrols. Combat experience determined that, as much as possible, officers should lead patrols since they tended to have the big picture and would see a mission to its completion. A patrol's success often depended on allowing ample time to accomplish the patrol. Lastly, once the patrol accomplished its mission, regiment and higher quickly received the patrol report, which hopefully included overlays. This was part of the dissemination process.

The U.S. Army and the commander in the field assumed that battalion and regimental S-2s knew all these techniques. The U.S. Army had published scouting and patrolling books in the 1920s. Considering World War I experience, these books and manuals mentioned many of the same techniques. The proper application of the tactical intelligence system during maneuvers would have led to the incorporation of these techniques subsequent to the war. The S-2 would have done it as a matter of course, as the U.S. Army attempted to resolve training issues. Army Ground Forces observer reports echoed many of these lessons and techniques in the ETO in 1944 and 1945.

The failure to gather information or maintain contact through patrolling invited a military setback or unnecessary casualties. Training materials and professional literature of the period provided two examples of intelligence mishaps after a failure to follow established doctrine. The examples are instructive in that they show what the military writers, shortly after Tunisia, emphasized as intelligence issues.

Outline No. 25, a lesson plan for training intelligence soldiers, described a lost opportunity to defeat the Germans early and with fewer casualties at Kasserine Pass. The 16th U.S. Infantry, Combat Command "B" of the 1st U.S. Armored Division failed to send out aggressive patrols to maintain contact with the Germans. This allowed the bulk of the Africa Korps to successfully withdraw from the Kasserine battle area largely intact. In the process, the Germans placed several thousand mines at Thelepte and Feriana airfields and along the Gafsa

route. The Allies required an additional month to regain their original lines before beginning the final drive to defeat the Germans in North Africa.¹¹⁷

The "Development of Combat Intelligence," an article in Military Review, provided a similar vignette in which American units suffered because of a failure to aggressively send out patrols and maintain contact with the Germans. It described a combat command, from 1st Armored Division, that stopped a German attack at Kasserine Pass. The unit observed the Germans in retreat, but did not maintain contact through aggressive patrolling. Because of that intelligence failure, in the evening, the Germans surprised the combat command and quickly overran its position.¹¹⁸

The Tunisian experience taught S-2s to emphasize the operation of observation posts. As in the case of patrolling, combat experience validated the doctrine. In FM 30-5, the U.S. Army identified the line battalion as the lowest level with assigned intelligence specialists, the scouts.¹¹⁹ According to doctrine, the observation post was a primary "means" to collect information for the battalion.¹²⁰ Infantry soldiers or scouts could occupy the observation posts.

The issue of manning observation posts in North Africa involved intelligence personnel preparing soldiers for duty in operating observation posts. The S-2 personnel had a training function to prepare line company soldiers in observation post duties. The Tunisian experience matched the doctrine. According to FM 30-5, intelligence personnel were responsible to give instruction in military intelligence to all soldiers.¹²¹ This included the manning of observation posts. In the ETO, S-2 personnel not only briefed soldiers preparing to man observation posts, but also operated them.

Even though well explained in FM 30-5 and prewar literature, combat experience refined the way that S-2s employed observation posts. Army combat units in North Africa viewed observation posts as crucial to preventing surprise enemy attacks and providing intelligence. As such, they provided the same function during the day as the night patrol did "during hours of darkness."¹²² The desert battles emphasized the importance of setting up multiple observation

posts whether in defensive positions or a "temporarily stabilized situation."¹²³ It was vital that the battalion S-2 and the artillery officer coordinated on the placement of the observation posts since it could "accomplish a FPL [Final Protective Line] function."¹²⁴ Experienced S-2s learned that for security purposes observation posts should employ only wire communications, because radio antennas made a tempting target for enemy gunners.¹²⁵ Combat experienced S-2s selected an observation post's position based on "maximum daylight efficiency."¹²⁶ The S-2s learned that good camouflage was important because of the danger of enemy artillery fire. Front-line units fighting in the ETO relearned this lesson several times. The doctrine, directly or indirectly, anticipated these lessons and techniques.

In view of the U.S. Army's experience in Tunisia, the importance of the observation post as explained in doctrine was confirmed in battle. Doctrine stressed its proper employment as a collection agency for the S-2 and his unit. Professional literature discussed the combat insights concerning the observation post.

The Mailing List, in an article published after the conclusion of the campaign, stated that soldiers in observation posts gathered information, or as the author described it, "battlefield dope," to ensure mission success.¹²⁷ The author derived his lessons from the desert. He described a training program for soldiers to accomplish observation post duties. He wrote about familiar themes, such as communications, and rapidly sending information up the chain.¹²⁸ Unsurprisingly, combat confirmed the viability of the U.S. Army's intelligence doctrine and it focused attention on the area where the S-2 needed to strengthen his performance.

The intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, on the surface, appeared well suited and equipped to function as a premier collection agency. However, after-action reports harshly criticized regimental S-2s for their employment of the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon in the Tunisian campaign. The U.S. Army's FM 7-25 provided comprehensive guidance on the employment and tactics of the platoon. However, North Africa showed that the American soldier failed to apply its wealth of soundly developed doctrine.

Professional literature and training materials admonished the S-2 not to allow the regiment to employ the platoon as a detail unit for the upkeep of the regimental headquarters, as occurred in North Africa. In defense of the S-2 in Tunisia, command post support was an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon mission.¹²⁹ However, commanders and S-2s misinterpreted this role in Tunisia. As originally envisioned, the S-2 could task the platoon to provide personnel to supplement his section.¹³⁰ In 24 hour command post operations, this was necessary. However, the average S-2 may have done this to the detriment of the patrolling function. Also, and regrettably for the platoon, the headquarters commandant usually out-ranked the regimental S-2. Undoubtedly, platoon personnel formed commandant details for the upkeep of the command post. Although command post support was a doctrinal mission, it was strictly secondary. The platoon's mission emphasis in the doctrine was on its patrolling and observation posts capabilities.¹³¹

The U.S. Army understood that the lack of training "probably resulted in the vegetation" of the I&R platoon during the battles in Tunisia.¹³² The platoons were "generally incapable of functioning on long range missions" which in turn saw battalions trying to perform those missions.¹³³ The platoon saw little operational employment in the Tunisian battles. When employed, they suffered heavy losses. As a direct result of the North Africa campaign, the U.S. Army encouraged S-2s to keep up the platoon's training to enable it to perform road reconnaissance, terrain analysis, dismounted patrols, night missions, and delaying actions.¹³⁴ A good S-2 maintained the platoon as "the best trained patrolling agency in the combat team."¹³⁵

In light of the experience of the Louisiana Maneuvers, the poor performance of the platoon was not a surprise. In the context of the available doctrine, it was a tragedy. Field Manual 7-25 explained how to properly employ the platoon. The battle experience in the desert reconfirmed the U.S. Army's doctrine at the cost of needless bloodshed.

The U.S. Army after-action reports throughout the war criticized S-2s for the poor employment and training of the platoon. The criticism was, to a degree, unfair. The average S-2 fought as he had trained during maneuvers. He was a victim of the U.S. Army's inability to

vigorously apply its doctrine in prewar maneuvers. The combat in Tunisia rapidly exposed this problem.

Prewar doctrine described other sources of intelligence that would be valuable to S-2s during the war. Doctrine noted the importance of prisoners of war as a valuable intelligence source. The experience of combat provided the S-2 with useful techniques in handling prisoners. During combat operations, battalion and regiment S-2s would only attempt to a brief prisoner interrogation to learn the "immediate tactical disposition of weapons, troops, artillery and reserves" and not waste time about "morale, conditions at home or other long range information."¹³⁶

Battalion and regimental S-2s learned the importance of speeding prisoners to the rear. They learned that it was important to separate officers and NCOs, particularly German soldiers, because of the strong discipline in the Wehrmacht.¹³⁷ Training materials of the time recommended keeping prisoner escorts to the rear at a minimum. Also, the S-2 learned that new or special equipment, such as a previously unknown weapon, merited priority transportation to the rear. All these were useful techniques and hints for the battalion and regiment S-2 in handling prisoners.

Lastly, there was the issue of counterintelligence. It served two missions. It was a collection agency, and it supported the S-2 in providing information denial against enemy collection efforts. Lessons learned documents strongly emphasized the S-2's counterintelligence role. Quite simply, the battalion or regimental S-2 was not to trust anyone. Several sources cited trusting U.S. soldiers killed by supposedly, friendly Arabs, who were providing Germans with the coordinates for artillery fire. It was the S-2's responsibility to warn unit soldiers of hostile civilian populations or his unit would suffer needless casualties.¹³⁸

Doctrine supported these contentions. When describing an S-2's functions, FM 30-5 stressed the requirement for S-2s to incorporate all counterintelligence measures in planning for operations.¹³⁹ Field Manual 30-25 defined counterintelligence for the U.S. Army. A component

of that definition dealt with unfriendly civilians who could pass information to an enemy about friendly troop units. The doctrine anticipated the situation of the local Arabs, passing friendly unit locations to German artillery units. In FM 30-5, there was a program of counterintelligence instruction for regimental and division intelligence schools.¹⁴⁰ As experienced in Tunisia, the S-2's role in counterintelligence would remain a persistent theme throughout the war.

It was clear the battalion and regimental S-2s had abundant sources of intelligence. Once the S-2 mastered these sources, as represented by the numerous collection agencies, the next issue was translation of gathered information into useful intelligence. The U.S. Army identified weaknesses in the evaluation and interpretation of information collected by the front-line S-2. The collation of information had not been a major problem. Collation involved recording the collected information. This was one area throughout war that presented few problems, beyond the occasional emphasis by observers on the need for the S-2 to keep the situation map updated.

On the other hand evaluating and interpreting data had not been a strong suit among S-2s. Field Manual 30-5 offered three tests in evaluating information. This test involved determining if the information had any value as intelligence, ascertaining the intelligence source's credibility, and judging the information's accuracy.¹⁴¹ Interpretation involved determining the significance of the information after it had passed the through the evaluation process.¹⁴²

Evaluation and interpretation were not easy processes to master. Without much training, the average S-2 gained competence only through the process of combat experience. In Tunisia, the primary problems S-2s encountered were in determining what was useful information and dealing with exaggeration. Information was exaggerated through the collection agency, like a patrol reporting a single tank as a company of tanks. However, exaggeration could occur when an S-2 attributed far too many capabilities to an opponent.¹⁴³

Once again combat confirmed doctrinal tenets. Some lessons and techniques gleaned from North Africa included knowing your enemy's tactics, leaving the command post to get a true picture of the battlefield, and not trying to conduct "big picture" analysis.¹⁴⁴ The latter was

especially true of S-2's since they did not produce finished military intelligence. Commanders learned that evaluation as important since "it is immutably a factor in the cause and effect in the development of operations."¹⁴⁵ In the ETO, commanders tasked battalion and regimental S-2s to evaluate information on likely German courses of action.

Tunisia taught that the commander and his S-3 "must dwell with care before operations can be planned effectively" on the S-2's evaluation of information.¹⁴⁶ The U.S. Army taught the S-2 that the key to his evaluations was accuracy, thoroughness, and personal objectivity, but it did not teach the S-2 a process of evaluation. The final helpful hint was to avoid "tendencies toward underestimating or overestimating."¹⁴⁷ With this training and the lessons learned, the ETO S-2 would attempt to evaluate information to support his commander.

The doctrine tended to support these insights. The U.S. Army did not expect battalion and regimental S-2s to produce finished intelligence. Information and combat intelligence were their products. Significant intelligence evaluation and analysis were to occur at division or at higher echelons. One intelligence pamphlet summed it up by noting that "intelligence personnel must know how the enemy operates. They must know the system of enemy patrols, of enemy weapons, of enemy small unit tactics. They must know the enemy thoroughly."¹⁴⁸

After gathering the information and determining its usefulness, it was important that it went quickly to those who needed it, whether front-line soldiers or the division G-2. The inability at the tactical level to quickly disseminate combat intelligence compounded the problems in collecting and interpreting information. Communications were important to the S-2 in Tunisia. Communication was a vital link in the success of the regiment S-2's operations. In line with the other S-2 functions, doctrine anticipated the importance of communications as relearned in Tunisia.

Communications were the key to pass information. Doctrine inferred the importance of communications. In FM 30-5, it stated that "prompt dissemination" was crucial to success in intelligence operations.¹⁴⁹ It emphasized that speed in information delivery in the division

intelligence system was the overriding concern. Although it did not clearly define the methods of communication, FM 30-5 recommended soldiers receive instruction on field telephones.¹⁵⁰

Again, combat experience refined the techniques. Wire communication was the most reliable means of communication. The training document's author placed less faith in radios, describing them only as "adequate," probably on account of reliability.¹⁵¹ Messengers were a "last resort" probably because they tended to become lost in fast moving situations or became casualties on their way to deliver information.¹⁵²

Apparently, once in combat, battalion and regiment S-2s did not utilize the existing communications structure of the battalion and regiment. The dissemination of information on enemy actions was poor during the Tunisian campaign. The S-2s did not react quickly enough to the rapidly moving and agile German forces encountered in Tunisia. The result was that U.S. Army units fell victim to sudden German counterattacks. The lesson was that, through "early recognition" or identifying the German main effort, combined with effective communications, the S-2s could have played a key role in breaking up these counterattacks by allowing the decisive employment of artillery.¹⁵³ The S-2 enhanced the combat power of his unit by warning his commander in a timely enough fashion to allow an effective response to sudden enemy attacks. After acquiring battle experience, the average S-2 understood the available communications resources within his unit. His access to them probably varied in each unit. Ultimately, the effectiveness of intelligence communications would depend on the individual S-2.

Finally, there was the composition of the battalion and regimental S-2 sections and the division tactical intelligence system. The S-2 sections received no additional authorizations for performing their functions. Although, before the war, the doctrine defined the intelligence chain within the division, operations in Tunisia saw the first stress applied to the system.

The battalion S-2 was responsible for staffing observation posts and managing patrols. His prewar role in command posts operations went unchanged by the Tunisian experience. The

personnel authorizations for the S-2 section remained unchanged from prewar levels. However, most S-2s felt their sections were severely understaffed.

The regimental S-2 remained responsible for overseeing the operations of the battalion S-2s, and the proper employment of the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon. He had the key role in transferring information from division to battalion and back up the intelligence information chain. Like the battalion S-2 sections, the regimental S-2 section remained at prewar strength levels, although, likewise, regimental S-2s viewed those authorizations as insufficient.

Through combat actions, it became clear that the regiment S-2 needed to "ride herd" on the S-3 and ensure that his commander knew of his intelligence conclusions.¹⁵⁴ A good relationship between the S-3 and the S-2 was important to unit success. The regiment S-2 did more than just point out problems and weaknesses with the S-3's proposed plans. More importantly, the S-2 could potentially provide the solutions to the identified problems with the S-3's plan. This assisted the commander and the unit in its mission.

The division tactical intelligence system held together under the stress of combat conditions. Like the battalion and regiments, the method of passing information and its path up and down the chain remained the same as before the war. The G-2 section did not increase in size. However, after the experience of combat, the average G-2 better understood that his effectiveness depended on the efficiency of the battalion and regimental S-2s. The key to the problems encountered by the intelligence system in the desert appeared to be training.

In Tunisia, the G-2 sections began to develop the techniques and procedures in employing the specialized intelligence teams. In Tunisia, the U.S. Army developed the ground work for providing these teams in support of tactical operations. So despite a rather battered reputation, the prewar tactical intelligence system survived to move on to the battlefields of Europe.

After the experience of the Tunisian campaign, professional literature suggested the desired characteristics of an S-2. The irony was that traditionally, the army filled the S-2 positions with weak officers. The poor prewar standing of the S-2 hurt his performance in battle. Like

General Heintzelman in World War I, commanders were learning that a competent S-2 could reduce losses on the battlefield.

Before Tunisia, FM 30-5 described the necessary characteristics that qualified soldiers as intelligence personnel. Imagination, initiative and “zeal” are some of the recommended traits.¹⁵⁵ This matched up well with the lessons learned about intelligence soldiers of all ranks in North Africa. The key to success for the tactical S-2 was “hard work, aggressive patrolling, patience and observation.”¹⁵⁶ Also, the position required “no end of initiative, resourcefulness, determination and ability.”¹⁵⁷ Certainly with limited training and resources, this was true for S-2s in all theaters throughout the war. It noted that if the S-2 was not “dynamic” he should “give up his job before he hurts too many people.”¹⁵⁸

An article in the Mailing List believed that an S-2 needed “enthusiasm and initiative.”¹⁵⁹ It illustrated the point with an example from North Africa. A regimental S-2 efficiently set up his work area in the command post. Then, he waited for the arrival of the reports from the line battalions to provide him with the intelligence picture. One battalion was attacking an enemy position. The regimental commander requested an intelligence update, to which the S-2 replied that there were no reports. The commander reprimanded the S-2 and sent him to the front to gather information. Applying initiative was the combat lesson.¹⁶⁰

With a degree of melodrama, the U.S. Army realized “in the hands of the S-2 lies the responsibility of the lives of his fellows” and that his “mistakes are paid off in blood.”¹⁶¹ This implied that the undertrained S-2 was a key element in the success or failure of operations at the battalion, regiment and combat command level. Also, it suggested that combat taught that an S-2’s success depended in part on his personality. Army Ground Forces observers mentioned these characteristics of successful S-2s in 1944 in the ETO.

Although the lessons of North Africa proved the usefulness of the intelligence doctrine, it highlighted training weaknesses. Throughout the war, the U.S. Army did not change its method and system for training battalion and regimental S-2s. The regimental and division intelligence

school system, developed in the 1930s served as the only means for preparing officers for S-2 duties in combat. The quality of the schools and their curriculum varied from one division to the next. They lasted one or two days. Judging by the prewar Command and General Staff School products, and after-action materials, likely, the intelligence schools emphasized patrolling skills, and determining enemy capabilities.

The nature of army training and the poor esteem of intelligence in the prewar period hindered the S-2 on the Tunisian battlefield. The ghosts of the Louisiana Maneuvers experience followed the average S-2 across the Atlantic Ocean. General Lucian K. Truscott served in North Africa as a staff officer, special observer, and a division commander. He made several significant observations about the initial combat performance of the average American soldier. His observations applied to S-2s as well. He was convinced of the ability of the U.S. Army to quickly train and "indoctrinate" the American soldier.¹⁶² He felt that the U.S. Army was, possibly, too effective. American soldiers entered the Tunisian campaign as if they were simply "on maneuvers."¹⁶³ American units, still fully capable of carrying on a battle, frequently surrendered to French units. This happened because during exercises, such as the Louisiana Maneuvers, units had surrendered whenever they found themselves at a disadvantage to the enemy.¹⁶⁴ They did not train to fight to regain the advantage.

During the Louisiana Maneuvers, S-2s had served more as detail officers than as intelligence officers assisting their commanders in the decision-making process, as required by the doctrine. Colonel Robb W. Chandler was the G-2 of 9th Infantry Division in North Africa. He confirmed General Truscott's observations as appropriate to battalion and regimental operations.¹⁶⁵ He realized that inexperienced American soldiers made the Torch landings. However, he believed the most inexperienced of these U.S. Army soldiers were the intelligence officers and their sections.¹⁶⁶ This included the S-2s in the line battalions. From his point of view, intelligence operations during exercises prior to Operation Torch were unrealistic. Compounding the problem, the S-2 section personnel served as the "odd job hands" during

training.¹⁶⁷ Insufficient training, combined with a weak prewar reputation, a poor image reinforced by major training exercises, such as the Louisiana Maneuvers, all contributed to a marginal performance by S-2 officers in the Tunisian campaign.

An incident during the invasion served as a striking example of this prejudice towards intelligence in general. The planning for the assault wave made no provisions for landing specialists teams. The radio intelligence companies landed early only because they agreed to go ashore as assault soldiers.¹⁶⁸ Risking trained specialists to serve as infantry was a reminder of the U.S. Army's lack of intelligence consciousness.

Ironically, FM 30-5 acknowledges the difficulty in training intelligence specialists and maintaining intelligence proficiency.¹⁶⁹ The recommended solution in doctrine was to take advantage of the training benefit provided by "maneuvers."¹⁷⁰ Prior to the Tunisian campaign, and in the Louisiana Maneuvers, there were ample opportunities to exercise the tactical intelligence system. It did not happen. These exercises tended to reinforce the negative image of intelligence and prevented an operational maturing to match the sound doctrine developed in the 1930s.

Obviously, the U.S. Army discovered many issues with its tactical intelligence system on the Tunisian battlefield. After culling battle reports, and conducting participant interviews, the U.S. Army identified fixes and tried to implement them. It did this through the media of formal training memoranda, pamphlets, and other training materials such as lesson outlines. Also, there was an outpouring of professional literature addressing the problems found in combat.

Through the medium of training memoranda, the U.S. Army identified critical intelligence weaknesses on the battlefield. The U.S. Army published Training Lessons Learned From The Tunisian Campaign, shortly after the German surrender in North Africa. As with all after-action and lessons learned documents relating to Tunisia, it listed several problems with intelligence. First, it illustrated the need to improve scouting and patrolling. The performance of those functions had been poor and the army blamed a lack of training as the culprit. It described

problems with the dissemination of intelligence throughout the division. It confirmed that the "principles of accuracy, timeliness, thoroughness, and alert action must be learned and followed."¹⁷¹ Its observations would be echoed in all subsequent publications of its type on Tunisia. Unfortunately, some of its findings would be echoed until the end of the war.

In June 1943, the U.S. Army published a pamphlet called, The Most Common Short-Comings in the Training of Battalion and Regimental S-2 Personnel, and Some Suggestions to Overcome These. It was an example of the medium employed to quickly capture the lessons of recent combat. Private Frank B. Sargent of the 34th Infantry Division authored the document. Essentially, it was a commentary on tactical intelligence operations during the Tunisian campaign.

It is unusual in that a private authored the document. Perhaps its publication indicated a degree of desperation to solve the intelligence problems discovered during battle. More likely, the U.S. Army designed it to appeal to the common soldier. The author wrote it in a style to get the attention of the draftee serving in the U.S. Army in 1943. It noted that the average U.S. soldier's standard of combat training was poor, compared to the level they needed to fight the Germans. The preface, written by Brigadier General J.G. Christiansen, LTG McNair's Chief of Staff, pointed out that the lesson of war is "a kill-or-be-killed affair" rather than any issues with tactical intelligence shortcomings.¹⁷² Nonetheless, it showed the U.S. Army's concerns over intelligence operations.

Much of Private Sargent's preaching as described in his pamphlet would sound familiar to ETO S-2s. Private Sargent went to great lengths to describe the importance of patrolling to a unit's success. The S-2's primary mission in the ETO was patrol management and the training of personnel for patrolling. S-2 personnel would accompany and conduct patrols in the ETO. Private Sargent strongly emphasized that at the battalion and regimental level, the S-2 was primarily responsible for observation post operations within a unit. In the ETO, S-2 personnel would plan for and occupy a significant number of observation posts. In somewhat dramatic form, he noted that to ably perform counterintelligence duties, the S-2 could trust no one,

particularly the local inhabitants. In 1944 and 1945, the S-2 would play a key role in counterintelligence in relation to the local French and German populations.

It is unknown how widely the U.S. Army disseminated this classified pamphlet. Possibly, S-2 personnel kept copies for ready reference during the war. Despite its elements of desperation, inspiration, and experience sharing among the common soldier, its intelligence insights, gained in desert combat, are in line with prewar doctrine, and lessons learned in the Louisiana Maneuvers. The pamphlet highlighted patrolling, observation posts, communications, planning, and counterintelligence as the battalion and regimental S-2's five areas of responsibility. These are familiar themes mentioned in the prewar doctrine. It was not as all-encompassing as FM 30-5 or FM 7-25, nor was that its purpose. Nonetheless, the pamphlet indicated the U.S. Army's desire to fix intelligence operations, and it did not invalidate the doctrine.

Training material produced after the end of the North Africa campaign served as a medium for incorporating improvements into the U.S. Army's intelligence operations. A training packet, compiled by the Allied Forces Headquarters, Intelligence Training Center, demonstrated the influence of the Tunisian campaign on the training of S-2s. Also, it provided insights about the S-2's experiences on the battlefields of North Africa. This packet contained material dated 16 October 1943 and 8 February 1944. The program of instruction was Outline No. 25, LOWER ECHELON INTELLIGENCE. Its training audience was intelligence specialists, probably order of battle personnel, intelligence scouts, and members of the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon. It is possible this audience included S-2s in regimental and division intelligence schools. As with the lesson learned pamphlets, it served to confirm prewar intelligence doctrine. Additionally, it conformed with the professional literature of the time concerning on-going intelligence operations.

In similar fashion to the other post Tunisia professional writings on intelligence issues, Outline No. 25 covered, in depth, the weaknesses of battalion and regimental intelligence operations in Tunisia. Also, it provided a list of recommended solutions for these problems.

Outline No. 25 involved several areas. It provided instruction and lessons learned on patrolling, the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, observation posts, communications, evaluation of information, collection agencies, and the required personality characteristics of successful S-2s.

Outline No. 25 blamed intelligence's poor showing on, "ineffectual '2' work in all echelons, and what might be considered a summation on a grand scale of the generally below par intelligence performances that characterized the Tunisian campaign."¹⁷³ Clearly, the U.S. Army, in training documents, recognized the S-2 as a critical player in the success of an American unit in combat at all echelons. The battalion and regimental S-2s bore partial responsibility for the unnecessary casualties because of tactical intelligence failures.

Outline No. 25 insinuated that the average S-2 knew the doctrinal part of their position as prescribed in the available field manuals. This was unfair since the U.S. Army limited the S-2's formal training to attending regimental and division schools. With unintentional irony, Outline No. 25, stated that battalion and regimental S-2s failed to understand that combat was not like peacetime maneuvers. Their weak battlefield record verified that the S-2s had been given little opportunity to practice their functions in prewar maneuvers.

At the close of active operations in North Africa, soldiers, both officers and enlisted men, wrote articles in professional magazines discussing lessons learned in fighting the Afrika Korps. The articles appeared in such journals as the Military Review and the Mailing List. The U.S. Army published pamphlets and training documents to quickly capture the lessons learned for the soldiers in the field. Collectively, this literature confirmed the efficacy of the current doctrine. However, it focused on those areas, such as patrol management, in which the individual S-2 needed to improve his personal performance. Also, it established what functions were important to successful S-2 operations. It is important to remember the current doctrine in 1943 came from Colonel Schwien's lectures in the 1930s, which served as the draft for FM 30-5.

However, the purpose of all this literature was to educate the intelligence soldier of lessons learned and to emphasize the importance of the S-2 to combat success at the tactical level. The intelligence specialists carried these lessons into battle in the ETO in 1944 and 1945.

Lastly, the specialists intelligence teams provided a bright spot in an otherwise mediocre intelligence performance in North Africa. Also, they pointed the way to the future of intelligence in the U.S. Army. In June 1942, the U.S. Army established the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland.¹⁷⁴ This tracked with U.S. Army doctrine that emphasized the importance of centralized schooling in conducting "specialized" intelligence training.¹⁷⁵ The center established a training program to train intelligence specialists for Operation Torch.¹⁷⁶ This was done over the objections of the Army Ground Forces, which felt that such specialists were an "unjustified luxury."¹⁷⁷ In line with prewar prejudices, the Army Ground Forces never provided soldiers for specialized intelligence training or school staffing at Camp Ritchie.¹⁷⁸ Throughout the war, personnel selected for specialized intelligence training came from the Army Service Forces.¹⁷⁹ The first classes began in July 1942. The various courses were eight weeks in length.¹⁸⁰ As a comparison, the average S-2 assumed his duties after a two day course at a division school, and yet the duties of an S-2 were as complex as those performed by the specialized teams.

At Camp Ritchie, several types of specialists teams were organized and trained for their missions in North Africa. These included Interrogator of Prisoner of War (IPW) teams, Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII) teams, Photo Interpreter (PI) teams, and Order of Battle (OB) teams.¹⁸¹ The IPW teams interrogated and processed prisoners of war. The MII teams translated and processed captured documents. The PI teams analyzed aerial photos and produced summaries describing the military value of the photo. The OB teams tracked the organization, strength and equipment of enemy forces. These teams were the nucleus of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) that would support ETO S-2s.

Additionally, there were the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC). They played important parts in the North Africa campaign. Both these organizations would become important sources of intelligence for the ETO S-2.

The Signal Intelligence Service was under the control of the Signal Corps. However, traditionally, its primary customer was the War Department G-2. For tactical operations, it furnished radio intelligence companies to support combat units. Highly trained, these units performed well in the desert. Five radio intelligence companies supported the campaign, one of which was the first intelligence agency to identify the withdrawal of German forces from Kasserine Pass.¹⁸²

The War Department had established the CIP, forerunner to the Counterintelligence Corps, in 1917. Renamed in 1941, the CIC was well organized and trained. The organization had prepared for the outbreak of war since 1940. Its school was in Chicago, and its headquarters in Washington, D.C.. Its primary mission was counter-espionage and operational security. It would enjoy much success in North Africa. The actions of the corps in Tunisia formed the framework for coordinating its activities with tactical intelligence officers in divisions. This framework would carry over to operations in the ETO.

Field Manual 30-5 anticipated the creation of many of these organizations and built upon the established ones such as the CIC. Under the category of "collecting agencies," FM 30-5 identified the requirements and functions of each these organizations.¹⁸³ Although each is described in detail, one example will give the flavor of the functions described for the collecting agencies. Field Manual 30-5 noted that captured enemy documents and prisoners supplied "valuable information relative to the enemy order of battle."¹⁸⁴ Although this appears to be a statement of the obvious, the U.S. Army did not create MII teams for document exploitation and IPW teams for prisoner interrogation until just before the Torch landings.

The Camp Ritchie teams were part of Patton's Western Task Force during the invasion. The first specialists ashore were the IPW teams. Shortly afterwards, the other teams came into the

theater. They established the procedures that would characterize their support of tactical operations for the duration of the war. For example, the U.S. Army established the method of requesting aerial reconnaissance, processing it through the PI teams, and disseminating it to the divisions in support of patrol operations.¹⁸⁵

Although these teams were distinct from the battalion or regimental S-2, they demonstrated the degree of intelligence proficiency that could be obtained with specialized training. S-2s would have greatly benefited from comparable training.

The intelligence doctrine developed in the 1930s by Colonel Schwien and the Command and General Staff School proved sound on the battlefields of North Africa. The U.S. Army entered combat with a very effective intelligence doctrine that required no modification after the close of the campaign. After the painful education of Kasserine Pass and the final triumph in Tunisia, the U.S. Army produced many after-action studies such as supplemental pamphlets and professional literature. The long enumeration of lessons learned and techniques honed in desert combat simply served to validate the doctrine. The prewar doctrine anticipated the laundry list of newly discovered ideas.

However, those first battles with the German Army exposed a serious weakness in the U.S. Army's ability to teach S-2s how to vigorously apply the doctrine. It was not the fault of the officer serving as the S-2. He was in a position viewed with some disdain in the field and long neglected by the U.S. Army. Major training exercises, such as the Louisiana Maneuvers, reinforced the negative view of intelligence instead of encouraging its growth based on an already very solid doctrinal foundation. The experience of war, at least, highlighted those S-2 missions that were vital to a unit's success and sometimes survival, such as patrolling and counterintelligence.

The lessons learned in the Tunisian campaign influenced the training the S-2 received as he entered the ETO in 1944 and 1945. However, this training was superficial when compared to the work requirements and expectations placed upon the S-2 in combat. The doctrine victimized

the S-2 to a degree. It promised great things, if correctly applied. However, the one or two day intelligence school was woefully inadequate in preparing the S-2 to meet the expectation of the U.S. Army's doctrine. The S-2 suffered in comparison to the trained professionals of the MIS teams.

So the S-2 left the battlefields of Africa for those of Europe. In his duffel bag was a good intelligence doctrine from the 1930s, a fistful of lessons learned in North Africa, and from after-action reports, a better idea of his critical functions in battle. He gained some stature as the Tunisian battlefield demonstrated his importance in the commander's decision-making process. Yet, there was an itch somewhere on the back of the S-2's neck that conveyed the thought that somehow this should all be easier, after all, the U.S. Army thoroughly explained intelligence operations in the field manuals. The U.S. Army would eventually resolve this uncomfortable feeling, but only with comprehensive training and the creation of a branch of trained specialists.

CHAPTER 4

THE FIRST STEPS TOWARDS A BRANCH: THE S-2s IN THE ETO, 1944-1945

The S-2 entered the ETO with a wealth of experience from the three previous years of war. Field Manual 30-5 was still intact, with some minor revisions irrelevant to the S-2 in combat. The U.S. Army did not change equipment and personnel authorizations from the beginning of the war for the battalion and regimental S-2 sections. Also, the U.S. Army did not make any modifications to the I&R platoon as it commenced operations in the ETO. The U.S. Army, as in North Africa, rediscovered that its intelligence doctrine was sound. In the ETO, the U.S. Army reconfirmed lessons learned in Tunisia and in the prewar exercises such as the Louisiana Maneuvers. The intelligence functions of the battalion and regimental S-2s did not change. However, some of their techniques on the battlefield improved, particularly in the area of exploiting sister organizations such as artillery battalions as sources of intelligence. The battlefield performance of the individual S-2s was brave. Yet, there was an undercurrent of thought that they were not properly supporting the commander in making key battlefield decisions. This was their primary doctrinal role. Part of the problem was rapid turn over of intelligence officers at the battalion level. The lack of training was the decisive factor in the rather average battlefield performance of the S-2. There were bright lights for the intelligence effort. For example, the combat commanders in the ETO heaped praise on the highly trained MIS teams. Field Manual 30-5 was the intelligence bible and guide for MIS teams and the S-2. Yet the S-2's lack of training did not allow him to exploit the sound tenets of intelligence doctrine. The voices

for an MI branch of trained specialists, first heard in the 1930s at Fort Leavenworth, became louder as the war neared its end.

It is necessary to recap the history of operations in the ETO for several reasons. The U.S. Army closely studied the operations in the ETO in this time period. They influenced the immediate postwar army, and, although in diminishing form, continue to do so to this day.

The S-2s played a role in every action. In the ETO, combat reconfirmed the importance of their functions, and launched the first real step towards an MI branch. The S-2 of 1996 continues to perform the same functions as the S-2 of the ETO in 1944, although, in many cases, there are differences in the doctrinal terminology. Only the new technology of the Force XXI Army may decisively change the role of the S-2, compared to his counterparts of the past.

The period examined begins with the D day landings on 6 June 1944. After successful landings, the Allies moved to expand the lodgment area. After the tough fight in the Bocage in Normandy, General Bradley launched Operation Cobra. The U.S. Army broke the German lines at Avranches on 31 July 1944. The liberation of France started in earnest. At the Falaise Gap, the U.S. Army inflicted a serious defeat on the Germans, although the Wehrmacht managed to extract a significant portion of its forces from encirclement. After rampaging through Brittany during the breakout operations, Patton's Third Army began its race across France in the Lorraine campaign, concluding with the liberation of Paris. The Allies invaded the south of France and pushed north, beginning in August 1944.

By October 1944, most Allied commanders and the combat soldiers were certain that the war would end by December 1944. The German Army did manage to inflict some severe setbacks on the Allies. The reduction of Metz proved difficult. The 1st Army under General Hodges needlessly wasted several regiments in the Hurtgen Forest. Operation Market Garden had been a costly flop. Late in 1944, "home by Christmas" seemed to be the battle cry of the U.S. Army.

The Battle of the Bulge commenced 16 December 1944. As it turned out, the war was not quite over, although this was the German Army's last gasp on the western front. Along with the Pearl Harbor attack, critics of intelligence operations point to the Ardennes offensive as one of the American military's great intelligence failures. Involved in this intelligence failure were the tactical S-2s. The success or failure of Army tactical intelligence was based on its building block organization. Forming the base for this system was the battalion and regimental S-2s. Their reporting, most often based on patrolling, set the tone for what divisions reported to corps, and corps reported to their army. Evidently, along with rest of the U.S. Army, the S-2s were ready to get home by Christmas.

After the shock in Belgium, the Army rolled quickly to and across the Rhine. The operations in the ETO ceased on 7 May 1945. The U.S. Army was holding positions along the Elbe River, and in Austria and Czechoslovakia. The German Army never seriously threatened the Allied advance after December 1944. Intelligence soldiers built up a wealth of experiences during these operations and the resilient FM 30-5 remained effective and applicable to ongoing operations, five years after its publication.

Besides the doctrine, the division tactical intelligence system which included all the S-2 sections had not significantly changed since the 1930s despite the combat in the ETO. However, the MIS teams and other collection agencies were reshaping the intelligence process in the division. The U.S. Army began to de-emphasize patrolling as a primary method for intelligence collection and to exploit other capabilities such as the photo interpreter teams and CIC teams. Out in the field, divisions and regiments created ad hoc units to fix intelligence problems. Although the system and doctrine did not change, the way of doing intelligence altered as units grappled with the need for accurate intelligence.

For three reasons, it is worthwhile to examine the history, organization, and training of the Military Intelligence Service specialist teams. First, these teams played an important role in setting the foundations of the Military Intelligence branch.

Secondly, they received much praise for their intelligence work. Many division and regimental after-action reports and unit histories mention the specialist teams trained by Fort Ritchie and the high quality of intelligence they provided to the supported units. The chief of staff of the 6th Armored Division in late 1944, stated that the "Ritchie trained teams are worth their weight in gold."¹⁸⁶ The official history of Fort Ritchie proudly noted the numerous compliments it received from commanding generals for the high quality of the intelligence soldier. In comparison, the effort of S-2s in the division tactical intelligence system fared poorly when making an overall judgment of the intelligence contribution to the war.

Lastly, these teams would provide significant support to battalion and regimental S-2s in the field during 1944 and 1945. The personnel strength of the MIS was 3334 on 25 February 1945. Considering their small size, the reputation of the MIS teams is even more impressive.¹⁸⁷

The G-2 , ETO, formed the Military Intelligence Service in November 1942 in Washington, D.C.. The purpose of the MIS was to provide the administrative control over the variety of specialist intelligence teams and field operating agencies supporting the G-2 section, ETO.¹⁸⁸ The MIS proceeded to organize its units and moved to the United Kingdom in February 1943. It was formed into teams MIS-X and MIS-Y. The former debriefed escaped allied POWs, the latter interrogated enemy POWs. In April 1943, the G-2 ETO combined these units and this became the MIS Detachment. The MIS dropped the term "detachment" in September 1943.

The MIS in December 1943 picked up responsibility for the MIS specialist teams which were just arriving in theater from Fort Ritchie, Maryland. These teams, like their sister elements in Tunisia, consisted of Interrogator of Prisoner of War (IPW) teams, Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII) teams, Photo Interpreter (PI) teams, and Order of Battle (OB) teams.¹⁸⁹ Very likely, veterans from Tunisia would join these teams at the end of the North African campaign. The CIC was already in theater. An established organization, the CIC administratively combined with the MIS in July 1944, but always maintained a degree of independence.

Although, not regarded as the primary elements of the MIS, the specialist teams came to dominate their parent organization through sheer numbers and usefulness on the battlefields. They were the largest element of the MIS. As a field agency they were with the front-line troops, where they were widely recognized and highly regarded.¹⁹⁰ In the ETO, it appears that most division G-2s provided regimental S-2s external support in the way of specialist intelligence teams. In turn, depending on the unit's mission, regimental S-2s provided battalion S-2s with small detachments of these specialists. Ultimately, the U.S. Army judged all MIS efforts such as its strategic functions on the performance of the MIS teams. Unlike most strategic intelligence organizations, in the specialist teams, the MIS had an element that was visible to the combat units and did not hide behind classified credentials.

As noted in FM 30-5, the success of an intelligence service depended on the careful selection of high caliber personnel. Moreover, the doctrine stated the best way to train intelligence personnel was through centralized training. The MIS benefited from both of these doctrinal tenets. To emphasize the necessity for good quality personnel, FM 30-5 recommended immediate relief of any officer that failed to meet the highest standards.¹⁹¹ Additionally, according to doctrine, intelligence success demanded comprehensive training about intelligence methods (interrogation techniques as an example) and a potential enemy. As described in FM 30-5, the tenets should have applied to the selection and training of the battalion and regimental S-2s.

The selection process for the MIS was fairly rigorous. Field Manual 30-5 indicated that officers selected for intelligence duty should be trained in every facet of an opponent's military capabilities and be the best qualified officer available.¹⁹² The enlisted intelligence specialist had to be in outstanding physical shape, and highly intelligent with at least a high school degree.¹⁹³ The personnel selection process for the specialist teams followed those doctrinal tenets. This did not always occur with S-2s, although the doctrine equally applied to personnel selected for S-2 duty in a division. For example, the Military Intelligence Training Center at Fort Ritchie proudly proclaimed that the average score of the soldiers selected for specialists training was 130 on the

Army General Classification Test.¹⁹⁴ Probably, these claims are a little enthusiastic, but it does show that the MIS benefited from a centralized screening and selection process. Unquestionably, their selection process was more strenuous than the one an officer underwent to become an S-2. Interestingly, despite their good reputation in the field, MIS personnel had a poor reputation for soldiering skills. Apparently, more than one division G-2 complained that the specialist "failed to accept the responsibilities of working in a military hierarchy."¹⁹⁵ Most likely, this meant the average intelligence specialist did not salute superiors on a regular basis. Because of pressing wartime requirements, the specialists went overseas without standard basic training. Unlike most of their civilian, draftee counterparts, they were not indoctrinated in the traditions of the service. Nonetheless, they performed well in the field and became indispensable.

The eight-week training program that all specialist teams (except CIC) underwent at Fort Ritchie was sound, but did not always meet the needs of a theater, because of the general nature of the curriculum. Furthermore, many of the skills (like most intelligence business, including S-2 work) taught to the specialists were highly perishable. The G-2, ETO, set up a comprehensive program to meet the needs of the MIS specialist teams. It established a school in theater for each specialty. It made arrangements for U.S. military personnel to attend British schools, which often served as the model for the new U.S. Army schools. In 1943, some specialists in England benefited from two to three months of additional training in their area. This changed as the U.S. Army began the build up towards D day.

It is important to briefly review the training of each type of team, in order to make a comparison with the S-2 training program. An officer serving as S-2, battalion and regimental, received two days of training in a division school, and may have gone to the school a second time if he remained or survived in the position. The S-2 did not benefit from a training baseline derived from a centralized, training program in intelligence operations.

An individual serving on an IPW team would undergo training under the direction of the Field Interrogation Detachment. The G-2, ETO sent school instructors to Italy for two months of

combat experience in order to teach the course. The students received training in their assigned language (French or German), the organization and tactics of the German Army, and how to identify key military personnel. There was also an attempt to make up for their lack of basic training in subjects such as map reading. The length of course is unknown. The British interrogation school was six weeks in length. The U.S. Army tended to model its intelligence schools on the equivalent British school. Therefore, it is probable that the U.S. course was approximately the same length.¹⁹⁶

The MII teams underwent an "extended course of training" under the Theater Intelligence Section, which belonged to the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The British Home Forces, Intelligence supervised the training of MII personnel. The course of instruction concentrated on French and German language skills. Also, it provided instruction on the organization and tactics of the German Army. In addition to this training, throughout 1943 and 1944, the majority of officers belonging to the MII teams received more instruction at the Royal Patriotic School. This training was along the same lines and covered the same subjects as conducted by the Theater Intelligence School. The MII teams translated documents and assisted in the interrogation of POWs. With their language skills, they helped with translation duties with local French and German civilians as the U.S. Army overran towns in France and Germany.

Like the other specialist teams, the PI teams received extensive training at British facilities, under the direction of the Home Force Intelligence Detachment, to supplement their Fort Ritchie training. They received training in a U.S. course that lasted three months, based on the British model. The G-2, ETO determined that personnel undergoing PI training needed three months of instruction. The U.S. Army supplemented this training with temporary duty for personnel in British PI detachments. As the war progressed and demand for PI teams increased, the G-2, ETO scaled back PI training to 30 days. Experienced PI personnel felt this was inadequate. Compared to an S-2 in a division, perhaps it was excessive.¹⁹⁷

Photo support to front-line troops was one of the most visible contributions made by U.S. Army intelligence. Occasionally, commanders and G-2s complained that it was lacking in timeliness. Yet, by 1944 in the ETO, S-2s and patrol leaders employed photos for patrol planning and as the actual patrol map. A 1944 U.S. Army infantry soldier often received better imagery support than an American soldier in 1991 during Desert Storm.

The ETO Order of Battle school began its courses of instruction in January 1944. In addition to OB specialists, IPW and MII personnel attended this school. The school was the shortest of the specialist schools. It consisted of two parts. The first course lasted nine days and dealt in detail about the German Army, its organization, and tactics. The second part was six days long and concerned the handling and interpretation of classified documents.¹⁹⁸

During operations in the ETO, the MIS supported the OB teams with two mobile training teams. These were the Mobile Order of Battle Familiarization Units. These teams accepted non specialist personnel into its training program.¹⁹⁹ The course curriculum followed the same pattern as the regular OB course but in less detail. Although, there is no evidence, it is likely S-2 personnel attended the courses provided by these mobile teams.

CIC personnel received twelve weeks of training in Chicago. However much of its training resembled law enforcement methods. In January 1944, the U.S. Army instituted a new 29 week program more suitable to preparing CIC personnel for ongoing combat operations. Unlike the other teams, CIC personnel did not benefit from training in England. Once overseas their training was haphazard and unorganized until the cessation of hostilities.

After the D day landings, all specialist schools (except CIC) moved to France. The course of instruction for each specialty did not change, other than to drop French subjects after 1944. The MIS would benefit from available and regular training to the end of the war.

When considering all the responsibilities involved in directing a World War II S-2 section in a battalion or a regiment, the S-2 was a more difficult position to master than carrying out the generally narrow function as a member of a specialist team. For example, the PI had a single

focus, which was interpreting the photograph that was before him. The U.S. Army required the S-2 to plan, collect, collate, interpret, and disseminate information from multiple sources. The average S-2 did this by managing a variety of collection agencies. By 1945, the battalion or regimental commander expected him to interpret photos and know order of battle as well as the highly trained personnel of the specialist teams. Field Manual 30-5 indicated that order of battle training was a necessary component of an S-2's training in the divisional school.²⁰⁰ The OB specialist received nine days of training. An S-2 received a few hours, maybe every couple of months.

So, despite the difficulty and importance of his mission, the unit S-2 merited two days of training about every three or four months in regimental and divisional schools. If his regiment and division each ran a course once a quarter for a year, the S-2, if he remained in the position for that length of time, theoretically would receive 16 days of training. In reality, officers rotated rapidly through the battalion S-2 section and would probably not attend more than one or two sessions of a division school. Considering the level of commitment for front-line regiments in the ETO, it is doubtful they ran many regimental intelligence schools on a regular basis. Furthermore, the officer assigned as an S-2, occupied a position some senior commanders thought was little more than an additional duty. A few commanders might not release the S-2 for training since he did not view it as a major priority. Thus, if an officer remained in the S-2 position for a year, he might receive eight days of training, mostly at division schools.

There were other benefits derived from the training of the MIS specialist teams besides good battlefield performance. The instruction received at Fort Ritchie provided the majority of graduates a "great measure of inspiration and enthusiasm for their work." Apparently, MIS specialists were aware that they were an elite group based on their training and selection process. During operations they enjoyed much freedom of action.²⁰¹ Taken together, these factors would indicate that dedicated intelligence professionals with a high esprit d'corps made up the MIS, much in the same fashion as members of the infantry are proud of their branch. Possibly, this type

of enthusiasm would have benefited S-2s in their duties, if the U.S. Army had followed doctrine and provided similar training.

Since MIS teams closely supported tactical intelligence operations, some specific examples will give a brief overview of their contributions and problems in the field. The G-2 in 6th Armored Division divided his IPW attachments into teams to support the combat commands, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized) and the division POW cage. They were invaluable to the combat command S-2s. They provided critical, relevant data on German anti-tank gun emplacements, mines, and artillery.²⁰²

In the 30th Infantry Division, the G-2 provided regimental S-2s with IPW teams. The G-2 formed IPW teams out of MIS attachments provided from a higher headquarters G-2. He did this to better assist the S-2s. The G-2 recommended the creation of more IPW teams so the G-2 could support the division POW cage. In the 30th, through the efforts of the IPW teams, POW interrogation and captured documents provided much of intelligence value.²⁰³

The 30th Division also provided an MII team to help the S-2 of the 120th Infantry Regiment negotiate the surrender of an SS detachment in the city of Magdeburg, Germany. The S-2 conducted the actual negotiations with the city's military commander with the language assistance from the MII team. The German commander refused to surrender, and the 120th captured the city against relatively light opposition.²⁰⁴

The Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) teams, again provided by the G-2, supported regiment and battalion S-2s. The CIC's primary purpose was "the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity and disaffection, and the detection and prevention of enemy espionage and sabotage."²⁰⁵ What this meant to the average S-2 varied depending on his unit's mission. Normally, it meant a CIC team warning of possible sabotage activity in a unit's vicinity or a request by CIC personal to screen recently detained civilians to see if there were any collaborators. The CIC teams in support of regiments constantly submitted reports on suspicious civilians and screened POWs for high ranking officials in disguise.

Postwar after-action reports comment favorably on the wartime performance of the MIS specialist teams. The U.S. Army considered the IPW, PI, and MII teams as collection agencies. The OB teams fell into the category of information processors. Most ETO G-2 officers (division, corps, and army) felt that IPW teams produced the greatest amount and most useful intelligence. The PI teams came in a close second, however, the G-2 viewed their products as the most accurate. Among the collection agencies, the MII teams placed third. They were a valuable asset but as linguists, the narrow scope of translation duties limited their versatility. However, the G-2 officers voted the OB teams as the most valuable component of the MIS. They prepared briefs for the G-2, they were the resident experts on the Wehrmacht, and their function was not dependent upon an outside source. For example, during bad weather the PI teams were of limited use without photographs, but OB teams in radio contact with line units could continue their duties regardless of the environment.

The division tactical intelligence system, its functions and organizations, remained unchanged from before the war. There were minor tweaks to make up for some shortfalls in TOEs discovered in combat. This involved primarily the combat commands. There were complaints that S-2 sections did not have the necessary number of personnel to properly conduct S-2 operations. However, the system of two way communications between the S-2 and the G-2 continued as designed in the 1930s and recorded in doctrine.

In the ETO, the U.S. Army emphasized the need for division G-2s to make visits to battalion and regimental S-2s. A smart S-2 would return the favor. This established good relations and ensured that intelligence flowed smoothly up and down the intelligence chain. There were exceptions. In the 3rd Armored Division, the G-2 had good radio and telephone communications with the S-2s in the combat commands. The division S-2s frequently came to the division CP. Therefore, the G-2 felt the "existing arrangements" were better than field visits.²⁰⁶ Referring to the 3rd Armored Division G-2 section, an Army Ground Forces (AGF) observer felt

that "particularly able, energetic, and enthusiastic S-2s may have been responsible, at least, in part, for the excellent work of the section."²⁰⁷ This was a rare compliment for S-2s in the field.

However, in terms of the two way transmission of information, G-2s and S-2s did communicate between the sections. The G-2 issued the daily essential elements of information orally, probably by radio, or by hard copy through messengers to the infantry regiments, division artillery, perhaps the POW cage to solicit updates from the IPW team, and, in some cases, other attached specialists teams such as an MII team. Some G-2s reduced the hard copy reporting, in order to enhance and maintain good relations between the G-2 and the infantry regiments. Apparently, not all the regimental S-2s viewed G-2 requirements as a priority, especially in written format.²⁰⁸ This made sense. The S-2 worked for a commander, not the G-2. Some S-2s took advantage of this staff relationship to ignore G-2 requirements. Probably, this was shortsighted, since G-2 products ultimately benefited the S-2s.

Combat taught the Army that S-2s were a necessary component to a successful operation. Many U.S. Army armored divisions employed their reserve commands the same way as their combat commands. The commands were similar to today's brigade. There was no TOE authorization for an S-2 in the reserve command. The reserve command did not have the organic communications to support an S-2 section for the division reconnaissance net. These armored divisions solved this problem at the expense of the attached tank destroyer battalion. This unit detached their S-2 and his section to the reserve command. The tank destroyer battalion S-2 came with his organic communications equipment.²⁰⁹ Apparently, these divisions recognized the usefulness of a functioning S-2 section in support of combat operations.

The 3rd Armored Division identified a need for a larger S-2 section for the combat commands. The typical combat command had an S-2 and an NCO. The G-2 believed that this was entirely inadequate. Therefore, during combat operations, a regimental S-2 and two regimental intelligence NCOs reinforced the combat command. In the 3rd, this was considered the minimum for "efficient operation."²¹⁰

On the European battlefields, once committed to combat, battalion and regimental S-2s became acutely aware of personnel shortcomings. Since the S-2 section frequently participated in patrolling activities and the manning of OPs, the complaints revolved around these areas.

The average battalion S-2 section normally had seven personnel. This varied from unit to unit. Some commanders felt the S-2 section required more personnel and provided the necessary soldiers from within the organization. The average S-2 did not believe he had enough personnel in two areas: the unit S-2 sections and the I&R platoons. As a rule, the S-2 provided intelligence section personnel and members of the I&R platoon for the command post and reconnaissance missions. The S-2 and a number of his men would have to go with the commander to operate the advanced CP during combat operations. The S-2 enlisted soldiers were required to man OPs. The members of the S-2 section served as liaisons to subordinate units or adjacent units. Finally, S-2 personnel remained at the CP in order to maintain 24 hour operations.²¹¹ I&R personnel helped man the CP in addition to other duties like POW guard. These requirements on a daily basis severely taxed the S-2 section and I&R assets.

Otherwise, nothing dramatic occurred to the basic organization of the division intelligence system. Essentially, it was a sound system based on cooperation and two way communications between the G-2 and the S-2. On the other hand, collection agencies that fed information into the system underwent a degree of expansion and experimentation.

The primary collection agencies in the ETO did not change from the North African campaign. Patrolling constituted the primary method of collecting information, although in the ETO, the MIS teams increasingly supplemented unit patrols and the I&R platoons. There was a sensing that patrolling was a costly method in manpower to collect information. Still, a year after Tunisia the U.S. Army suffered from a weakness in patrolling. The S-2 bore part of the blame for this weakness, particularly in the area of training. Combat units recognized the value of the I&R platoon but did not always fully utilize it. Several units did attempt to reinforce the I&R platoon

with ad hoc reconnaissance units. Finally, other sources of intelligence collection came to the fore. The artillery spotter aircraft became an important intelligence asset in the ETO.

In a recurring theme, combat commanders (at all levels) and AGF observers stressed the strengths and weaknesses in patrolling within an average American combat division. Some observers believed that quality patrolling was improving in the U.S. Army in the ETO, but there were still weaknesses. Many of these weaknesses would have looked familiar to veterans of the Tunisian campaign.

Many patrols limited their movements to roads and were not very aggressive. Units in direct engagement with the enemy failed to keep to keep contact with their opposing German units. There was a lack of deep patrols to gather intelligence on German units during the intervals between offensive operations. In comparison, the Germans constantly and aggressively patrolled, ranging deep into a U.S. division's rear area.

Observers and commanders noted that "much information was reported by front-line units, but was not always accurate."²¹² They attributed this to poor training for scouts and front-line soldiers. The soldiers were weak in identifying installations and equipment. Many combat commanders felt their soldiers needed training in patrolling. Night patrols were a major weakness. The pre-mission briefs were inadequate and that patrols did not always follow their mission orders. Patrols did not quickly disseminate patrol information. Patrol information was not going to those who needed it. It is possible that dissemination broke down at the regiment and battalion S-2 level in some divisions. The S-2 did not maintain enough control of the information after a patrol completed its mission. Apparently, S-2s did not vigorously follow up the patrol reports and track patrol information as it entered the communication channels. A well-briefed patrol had a greater chance of success. Indirectly, this referred to needed improvement in the S-2's area of responsibility. Several times, patrol reports were "vague and incomplete" and often soldiers ignored the four W's: who, what, when, and where.²¹³

The replacement soldier training in patrolling was poor. Probably, this was partially the fault of the unit S-2, since training was in his area of responsibility. New soldiers generally made too much noise. Apparently, many patrol leaders in the ETO hesitated in using replacement soldiers on patrols.²¹⁴ Often, unit replacements did not receive intelligence training and were not "intelligence conscious."²¹⁵ This observation probably applied to most new replacements arriving in the ETO in 1944 and 1945. Soldiers reported information inaccurately and intelligence officers wasted time trying to separate rumor from intelligence. The average soldier did too much of his own analysis when providing observations and patrol information on enemy activity through the intelligence chain.²¹⁶

Specific patrolling performance varied by division. In all cases, the responsibility fell into the area of the division tactical intelligence system, including S-2s and G-2s. In 9th Infantry Division, the G-2 did not plan and direct a cohesive division patrolling plan. The G-2 rarely requested "specific patrols" to fill in information gaps. It appears no one in 9th Infantry Division worried about patrolling except lower level combat commanders.²¹⁷

In the 30th Infantry Division, the "results were only fair" from patrolling.²¹⁸ The division G-2 directed patrolling. Patrol tasking for infantry regiments went through "intelligence channels," which probably meant through radio and messenger communications of the S-2s and the division G-2.²¹⁹ At least compared to the 9th Infantry Division, the 30th systematically organized and directed patrols.

The division conducted much patrolling while in the Bocage in June 1944.²²⁰ There were difficulties. Daylight patrolling was too dangerous because of the open terrain. Because of the time of year, night hours were short, and this left about an hour to reconnoiter German positions.²²¹ Compounding the environmental problems was the lack of patrolling experience in the 30th Infantry Division which was undergoing its first combat action of the war. Several patrols were unsuccessful, and the division sustained heavy casualties while patrolling. Staff Sergeant John J. Gilson, the regimental S-2 NCOIC of the 120th Infantry Regiment was killed on

patrol.²²² Wounded in the same action was the I&R platoon leader of the 117th Infantry Regiment.²²³

However, skills rapidly improved in the classroom of war and intelligence gained through patrolling showed that the Germans in front of the 30th had little depth and had heavily augmented their forces with Poles and Russians. This information was useful when the 30th mounted the Vire River crossing in July 1944.

To correct the patrolling problems, units improvised special ad hoc units within their organization for intelligence purposes. The purposes varied. Most involved intelligence collection although this was not always the case. Interestingly, the TOE authorized each infantry battalion a certain number trained scouts and every regiment, armor or infantry, had the I&R platoon. Yet, units felt it necessary to create their own special patrol agencies. To build units out of hide when assets for the same purpose already existed, seemed to indicate a lack of faith in the current system. Whatever inspired individual regimental and divisional commanders to create new assets and not more vigorously employ current ones is not clear. However, some of these ad hoc agencies are worth reviewing, in order to see how field commanders attempted to correct perceived intelligence problems in the field.

The 30th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division formed the Regimental Raiders at the direction of the 3rd Infantry Division Commander, Major General John W. O'Daniel. Originally this platoon was a well armed, special assault force for the beach landings of Operation Anvil in August 1944.²²⁴ However, it remained in existence for the duration of the war and the 30th Infantry Regiment employed it almost exclusively as a reconnaissance force. In November 1944, in conjunction with the regiment's I&R platoon, the Raiders reconnoitered the river crossing sites for the Meurthe River operation.²²⁵ In April 1945, the platoon conducted a reconnaissance of the Regnitz River crossing sites in the vicinity of Nuremberg.²²⁶ The commander of the 30th Infantry perceived that the I&R platoon did not have the capability to satisfactorily perform effective reconnaissance for the regiment. His special platoon, originally designed as an assault

force, became another regimental collection agency. It was a field solution to inadequate intelligence collection.

One AGF observer in the 30th Infantry Division recommended that the creation of a platoon of patrolling "specialists" would greatly improve patrolling.²²⁷ He recommended in his report that line companies no longer perform the patrolling function. Instead, each battalion would receive a 30-man platoon for reconnaissance.²²⁸ This implied that the I&R platoon at the regimental level was inadequate. Unknowingly, he recommended consolidating all the trained scouts authorized in the battalion TOE into a single platoon. Although, this proposal showed he lacked knowledge of the unit TOE, it demonstrated that the U.S. Army was trying to solve the problems with its collection agencies.

The 2nd Infantry Division created a unique organization to improve its intelligence collection. Unlike the 3rd Infantry Division, which formed special reconnaissance units, the 2nd Infantry Division, created Traffic and Security (TS) platoons to allow the I&R platoons to concentrate on their intelligence function.

Each regimental S-2 in the 2nd Infantry Division received a TS platoon to assist him. Its purpose was to supplement the regimental I&R platoon.²²⁹ The regimental S-2 was responsible for the TS platoon's training. During combat operations, the S-2 directly controlled the TS platoon. Its functions covered several missions like providing intelligence observers, guarding fuel supplies, providing IPW escort, and operating POW collection points.²³⁰ The regimental S1 controlled the TS platoon during regimental movements. The TS platoon provided the traffic control section for a battalion or regimental advance party. During "static" operations, the TS platoon belonged to the regimental headquarters commandant for CP security.

The 2nd Infantry Division and V Corps approved the creation of the TS platoon.²³¹ Formed from line companies, the platoon consisted of a platoon leader, platoon sergeant and three seven man squads. During combat operations, the platoon simultaneously performed three different missions, assigning a squad to each mission. The command and control arrangements

for this platoon were probably cumbersome. How much authority the regimental S-2 exercised over this unique organization probably depended on the strength of his personality.

The Regimental Raiders and the 2nd Infantry Division's TS platoons give insight on how U.S. Army regiments employed the I&R platoon. The TS platoon released the I&R platoon from duties like POW guard detail. Presumably, a line unit could have performed this function. However, some units chose to use a potentially valuable intelligence collection asset to perform this routine work. In turn, intelligence collection suffered a setback. However, at some point, units recognized the need to employ the I&R platoon in its doctrinal role. The TS platoon allowed the I&R platoon to function as designed.

Some units came to the conclusion the I&R platoon needed reinforcement to execute its critical intelligence function. Normally the I&R platoon deployed well forward of its parent unit. Lightly armed, and equipped only with jeeps and combat cars, the I&R platoon did not have the firepower to survive a surprise meeting engagement with a German tank platoon or a small Panzer Grenadier reconnaissance element. This may have inspired a degree of hesitation on the part of the platoon members. Those units created specialized units such as the Raiders.

In one way, World War II was the last hurrah for the I&R platoon. It would see action in Korea under the same TOE and conduct its operations with the same doctrine. However, after the UN stabilized the lines in 1951, Korea was fought along the same lines as World War I, with little maneuver. The I&R platoon operated like an ordinary line platoon on patrol. The I&R platoon quietly faded from the U.S. Army in 1965, a victim of the nuclear battlefield doctrine and just before the Army's widening involvement in Vietnam. Yet, in 1945, the I&R platoon of the 259th Infantry Regiment, 65th Infantry Division, could claim to have made the deepest penetration of the western front by any unit of the U.S. Army, when it reached Haag, Austria, on 7 May 1945.²³²

Lastly, as a collection agency, observation posts deserve a quick look. Desert experience did not translate to ETO success. Two years after the Tunisian campaign, observation post techniques were still less than perfect. On 25 August 1944 near Brest, the I&R platoon leader of

the 9th Infantry Regiment set up an OP in the control tower of a captured airfield. The regimental commander, his S-2, the I&R platoon leader, and an observer spent an hour in the OP. From their vantage point, they had a "perfect" view all the way to Brest.²³³ The Germans shared this view. Shortly after the commander and his S-2 departed the tower, the Germans destroyed it by artillery fire, killing the I&R platoon leader and the observer. A German POW later stated he was a member of the gun crew that destroyed the OP. The POW remarked how surprised he was that the Americans made very little effort to camouflage themselves and casually smoked cigarettes as they "pointed" out terrain features.²³⁴

This remarkable example is important because it involved nearly all the key players of a regimental intelligence operation. All that was missing were the battalion S-2s. The 9th Infantry Regiment was a combat hardened unit. The unit commander, the S-2, and the I&R platoon leader were involved the placement and operation of the observation post. According to doctrine, these three were key to any successful intelligence mission conducted at the tactical level. However, like many units in the ETO, they did not observe or were unfamiliar with the lessons of Tunisia.

Notwithstanding, intelligence personnel did try to take advantage of other assets on the battlefield in order to improve the intelligence effort of their individual units. One innovation was the use of artillery spotter aircraft. Usually these were light aircraft like Cubs or Stinsons. They made a valuable contribution to intelligence collection. They were effective, timely, and accurate as the pilot, a trained observer could directly look at enemy units. Remarkably, they were difficult to shoot down because of their small size.

The 9th Infantry Division viewed the division artillery and its elements as very valuable intelligence assets. The G-2 believed that the best reconnaissance asset in the division was the field artillery's Cub spotter planes.²³⁵ The 30th Infantry Division's official history mentioned the high value of artillery spotter aircraft as a source of intelligence.²³⁶ The G-2 had such a high estimation of their value that he had a direct phone link established with the division artillery S-2. Apparently, this G-2 did not place a premium on intelligence gathered from patrolling. He stated

those "shell reports promptly and accurately reported by the infantry have been invaluable aids to successful counterbattery. Infantrymen really respect the field artillery and it didn't take long to teach infantrymen how to report shell reports."²³⁷

The collation, evaluation, and interpretation of intelligence did not vary much from Tunisia. Collation involved gathering all information on one spot before the S-2 began to evaluate the data. The most visible sign of collation was the S-2's situation map with which he kept track of the enemy situation. The S-2 NCOIC was responsible, in practice, for collation. The S-2 concerned himself with the thinking process, while the NCOIC kept track of the data, and made it available for ready reference. How units performed collation varied with the personality of the S-2. A standard operating procedure (SOP) established the guidelines. Collation of intelligence was not a major issue in the ETO.

Evaluation of information revolved around one problem in the ETO. An S-2 considered all pieces of information that came through his section. The S-2s were taught not to ignore any source. However, all S-2s fought a constant battle against exaggeration by the soldiers of their units conducting patrols or providing battle reports about enemy activities. There was no solution to this issue and by the end of the war the U.S. Army had not solved the problem. Combat experience and training of the unit soldiers reduced the problem. The individual S-2's level of experience sometimes provided a partial answer. The S-2s fell back on doctrine and tried to ensure that the information they received from the collecting agencies fulfilled the essential elements of information (EEI) and the collection plan.

Interpretation was the art of trying to make sense of the information in your possession. Predicting an enemy's next move is traditionally an inexact science. Once the S-2 evaluated the information for usefulness, he then tried to make a call. There is no clear statement on how well S-2s performed interpretation of information. However, if the G-2 reports and estimates prior to the German attack through the Ardennes were a measure, they needed improvement in this area. A comprehensive training program would have given the S-2 the tools he needed to rapidly gain

evaluative and interpretive skills in combat. In other words, a training baseline would have quickly complemented battle experience.

Dissemination of information, and combat intelligence did not appear to be a major issue in the ETO. There was the sensible emphasis on speeding perishable intelligence to anyone that required the information. Division radio and wire communications, and a messenger system, were reliable enough to get the information disseminated to the required units. The S-2 or occasional German interference caused the obstructions to the information flow. Sometimes an individual S-2 mistakenly decided not send information to a sister unit. This was a problem that normally went away with experience.

Dissemination could take many forms. The S-2 could orally deliver a report to the concerned party (a company commander or sister unit). Most often, the intelligence officer disseminated any information or intelligence as a hard copy report. There were several different types. There was the formal written G-2 estimate. This was normally a broad overview of the enemy situation. These were normally too broad and out of date to be of interest to a regiment or battalion. The G-2 and S-2 published periodic reports which intelligence officers issued daily. These were popular and provided line units with a "morning newspaper" about enemy activities.²³⁸ Lastly, there were special intelligence reports that involved a special topic of interest such as a newly discovered item of German equipment.

Some units placed great stock on these reports. The G-2 in 6th Armored Division was highly regarded within his division. If a commander did not receive a G-2 daily summary, he called the G-2 and requested one.²³⁹ No doubt, this atmosphere greatly benefited the regimental and battalion S-2s. In this division, the G-2 and G-3 sections worked "hand and glove with each other."²⁴⁰ The sections kept each other informed and knew the others' activities at all times. Dissemination appeared to be the least of the S-2's problems.

The doctrine was intact and the S-2 strove to accomplish his mission and support his commander and unit on the battlefield. Yet, intelligence's poor prewar reputation and a lack of

intelligence consciousness among combat commanders continued to affect operations in the ETO. The situation had not improved significantly since the Louisiana Maneuvers. This lack of respect of the S-2 section came in many forms. It appeared when commanders primarily employed the S-2 for missions other than intelligence operations. The S-2 function became simply another additional duty. Also, this prejudice surfaced in the cartoons of the time, like Bill Mauldin's "Willie and Joe." Lastly, the same issues of the prewar period resurfaced again and again. The best officer did not occupy the S-2 position as recommended by General Heintzleman. The I&R platoon pulled headquarters commandant details. The S-2 was not always consulted on operational planning. The front-line soldiers suffered because the image of the battalion and regimental intelligence officer did not inspire enough confidence to promote their effective engagement in operations.

As already mentioned, officers in S-2 positions rapidly rotated among the battalion and regimental officer positions. Equal in status to the S-3 according to doctrine, prewar literature, and current wartime literature, on the battlefield this was not the case. The officer in the S-3 position held his job because an experienced officer in the S-3 position was crucial to a unit's success. The nature of combat demanded that an officer serve long enough to be effective. With the cloud of the past, the S-2 never achieved an equal and necessary footing.

In 1944, there was a shortage of personnel in the combat divisions. General McNair had designed a lean division structure to optimize manpower and battlefield flexibility, but battlefield losses stressed this lean structure to the breaking point. This was felt at all levels. As an example, in 4th Armored Division, the staffs of the combat commands sought compromises to ease the shortages. One recommendation to ease this shortage was to combine the S-2 and S-3 sections. This may have forced upon the S-2 and S-3 some cooperation.²⁴¹ However, what it meant in practice was that commanders felt they could largely ignore the S-2's duties. Several commanders likely believed the S-2 position was easily handled as an additional duty.

Apparently, this recommendation was based on an already established practice. The G-2 of the 4th Armored Division noted "the many times mentioned complaint" that the regimental S-2 frequently serves as an assistant S-3.²⁴² By implication, this was a common practice throughout the U.S. Army in the ETO. Probably, it interfered with the G-2's collection of information from front-line units. If the S-2 was acting as the assistant S-3, the G-2's requirements would be a low priority. It is doubtful in such a situation the section intelligence sergeant carried enough rank, without an S-2 officer, to support G-2 requirements. He would be unable to provide any necessary information feedback to the G-2. Probably, he could not task or direct patrols to cover information gaps. It probably limited the S-2 section's ability to carry out 24-hour operations. The implication was that the combat commanders saw a better use for the officer in the S-2 position. One observer recommended that "if possible, these officers should be interchanged but each has his primary mission."²⁴³ Yet, more importantly, it demonstrated that this lingering prejudice hindered the effectiveness of the division tactical intelligence system. Also, it showed that the average combat commander in the ETO did not get enough of a return from his commitment of an officer to full time S-2 work.

The image of the S-2 suffered in popular cartoons of the time. Bill Mauldin shows in one of his famous wartime cartoons an intelligence NCO in a command post performing simultaneously several functions. The S-2 officer, who has the appearance of a cast off, is complaining that the intelligence sergeant, who is obviously overworked, is distracting from the enjoyment of his newspaper. Intelligence sergeants, normally scouts or draftsman, received more training than the average S-2. This image of the S-2 was prevalent enough Mauldin's experience to inspire the cartoon and confirmed that weak officers tended to fill S-2 positions. Perhaps Bill Mauldin would not have harshly lampooned the S-2s if they received the training necessary to efficiently perform their duties and fulfill the potential of their doctrine. Throughout World War II, the S-2 could never quite outrun the ghosts of the prewar training maneuvers.

In the ETO, the S-2 did his duty. In general, the S-2s left the battlefields of Europe with a good reputation after a difficult journey. The MIS teams developed an excellent reputation, and their products were popular with front-line commanders and soldiers. The commanders and AGF observers criticized S-2 sections on their attempts at managing collecting agencies such as the I&R platoons and unit patrols. The S-2 sections relied heavily on the military intelligence produced by the MIS teams. Often, units counted upon S-2s and S-2 sections to perform the same functions as these specialist teams. However, the S-2 and his section did not have the same comprehensive training as an OB or PI team. Moreover, although the S-2's doctrinal functions encompassed all the areas of responsibilities assigned to each individual MIS team, they were not accorded the same respect, nor granted the same level of training. Therefore, the S-2 unnecessarily suffered in comparison. Still haunted by the ghosts of prewar training maneuvers, ETO S-2s strove to accomplish their vital, casualty reducing vocation at a training disadvantage. A trained intelligence officer specialist, coming from a centralized intelligence school could have performed the doctrinal functions of planning, collection, collation, and dissemination much more efficiently than the sometimes unfortunate infantry officer abruptly appointed to the position. This intelligence officer would have known how to effectively employ the MIS teams, without a trial and error period in combat. It is possible that intelligence specialists occupying the battalion and regimental S-2 positions of front-line units would have contributed to lower casualties on the battlefields of Europe in 1944 and 1945.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: THE BIRTH OF A BRANCH

The great conflict finally came to end. The cycle of the past wars began almost immediately. The U.S. Army underwent a massive demobilization. The peacetime army in the late 1940s would not even qualify as a shadow of its former World War II self. The painful and sometimes bloody development of a group of intelligence specialists in support of the war effort immediately began to fade away from the U.S. Army's rolls. The difference this time was that there were loud voices for a single, permanent corps of intelligence specialists. Yet, the prewar sentiments against intelligence held sway and the U.S. Army entered the Korean War without an effective tactical intelligence system. Field commanders, bewildered, were furious that, once again, the U.S. Army was repeating those mistakes learned in blood in World War I in the blind charges of the assault battalions, and the fresh memories of the painful and slow growth of the tactical intelligence system in World War II. If World War II was the windup, the Korean War was the shove that led to the formation of a corps of intelligence specialists almost 200 years after George Washington's short-lived legacy of intelligence success. The legacy of World War II is seen in the striking similarities and differences between the modern S-2 and the ETO S-2 in their duties and functions that serve to amplify the reasons for the existence of an Army intelligence branch.

The end of the war saw the beginning of a struggle to create an Army intelligence branch which would end in the early 1960s with the creation of the Military Intelligence Corps. First, there was the Lovett Board. Convened shortly at the end of World War II, it issued two reports. Its conclusions were not surprising. The current intelligence system at all levels was insufficient to

properly support the U.S. Army. It further noted that while intelligence performed admirably during the war, it was still dangerously inadequate. Importantly, it concluded that without a separate intelligence branch, successful intelligence operations were possible only with the full support of commanders at all levels. Obviously, that theory had not worked in the past.²⁴⁴

The period between the end of World War II and Korea saw many reorganizations of the U.S. Army intelligence system. The trend was to cut back on the intelligence services and departments. The U.S. Army closed the Military Intelligence Training Center in 1945 as a budget measure. Some senior army leaders believed peacetime intelligence training was unnecessary. Korea would reconfirm the lessons of World War II and show this was a mistake that would greatly hurt tactical intelligence. The U.S. Army deactivated the MIS in 1946. The War Department G-2, despite severe personnel cut backs, took over the world wide intelligence training responsibility from the G-3 who had simply ignored it. This was done to preserve the intelligence training base before it completely disappeared. However, intelligence training continued to decline throughout the service. In 1949, the U.S. Army convened the Eddy Board to review military education. One of its recommendations led to the abolition of the ten-week intelligence course at CGSS. This was unfortunate. At least prospective G-2s, prior to World War II, received fairly comprehensive intelligence training.

The reduction in the U.S. Army and the discomfiture of senior officers guaranteed that intelligence would assume the same weak posture it had endured in the 1920s and 1930s. The War Department G-2 submitted several reports decrying the decline of military intelligence. Additionally, it issued several reports calling for the creation of an intelligence corps. Some high level boards, such as the Lovett Board, agreed at least in principle with the G-2's recommendations. The recommendations centered on the need to maintain a trained body of intelligence specialists in the event of war. The experiences of World War II formed the basis of the recommendations. In the end, they lost the fight for a corps to the rapidly shrinking budget

and the old prejudice against intelligence. Besides, the country, now the world's premier nuclear power, was in a period of long-term peace.

Then came the shove towards an intelligence service in Korea. By the start of the Korean War, U.S. Army intelligence, from the newly formed Department of the Army down to the tactical level, resembled the situation of the 1930s. Experienced S-2s were no longer in the service. The soldiers underwent very little intelligence training of value. This breakdown in the intelligence system became quickly apparent in the miserable Korean countryside with its exhausting terrain and redoubtable foes. To recap the problems of the tactical intelligence system in Korea is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, the sequence of events and learning processes were identical to what occurred on World War II's far-flung battlefields. The price in blood as units blundered into ambushes was as grievous.

World War II, and its hard won intelligence lessons, was a fresh memory. It gave impetus to venting frustration about the sad state of intelligence affairs by senior Army officers with World War II combat experience. An unknown division commander noted that his weakest staff elements were the G-2 and S-2 sections in Korea. He declared that properly trained S-2s were vital on the battlefield.²⁴⁵ Once again, the old issue of intelligence training reappeared in the same old form but on a new battlefield.

General Van Fleet, the commander of Eighth Army, opined in 1952, that intelligence operations were not at the same level of proficiency as found in the U.S. Army in 1945. He noted that it was a result of "neglect, disinterest, and jealousy" that "much of the effectiveness in intelligence work that was acquired so painfully in World War II" was now gone.²⁴⁶ Ten years later the U.S. Army activated the Military Intelligence Corps. It never seriously considered doing without a professional corps of intelligence specialists after Korea. The one-two punch of World War II and Korea settled the issue at last.

Finally, it is important to study the similarities and differences between the tactical intelligence operations in 1945 and 1996 to gain insight on the specific experiences in World War II that prompted the creation of MI.

The S-2 of today and the World War II S-2 share some striking similarities. The basic role of the intelligence officer is largely unchanged. In the 1990s, the S-2's role is to reduce uncertainty about the enemy for his commander. In World War II, according to the doctrine, his role was the same. The term "uncertainty" is found in both today's FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence, and the FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence of 1940.

The S-2 in World War II was key to the G-2's success in collecting a significant amount of information. This consisted of primarily raw patrol information passed up the intelligence chain. He was the G-2's eyes and ears on the front-line action. Today's S-2 is crucial to the G-2's success for the same reasons. The bulk of information that a G-2 receives on what is actually happening at the front is coming from the S-2.

Reconnaissance information is crucial to the commander. A common S-2 deficiency in combat training centers (CTC) is the reconnaissance plan.²⁴⁷ Intelligence technology provides an abundance of information, but the S-2 reports what the front-line units actually see and experiences in action. Computers provide an artificial situational awareness; agitated soldiers provide the emotional edge and urgency to that awareness. This information mostly comes from unit patrolling or the scout platoon, the grandson of the I&R platoon. The S-2 in World War II was responsible for the battalion or regimental patrol plan. The battalion and brigade S-2, today, is responsible for the reconnaissance and surveillance plan whose ancestor was the patrol plan.

The reporting chain has not essentially changed. The battalion S-2s reported their information to the regimental S-2s or combat command S-2s. In turn, these S-2s reported their information to the G-2, who did the first serious analysis of the information to convert it to military or combat intelligence. The S-2 passed the information through the intelligence channels by courier or through radio communications. In the 1990s, the information travels the same paths

except instead of a regiment or a combat command, the battalion S-2 passes reports to a brigade S-2, who then relays the information to the G-2. However, the introduction of new technologies is changing the communications architecture, and obviously much more information at a faster pace can be transmitted by today's S-2.

Also, technology is dramatically redefining how intelligence personnel evaluate and interpret information. Nonetheless, as in World War II, real analysis on information begins at the division level. Battalion and brigade S-2s, especially in fast moving situations, rarely have the time or the assets to carefully analyze raw intelligence. Also, today's S-2 has numerous methods of passing information to the G-2. Besides radio and courier, he employs the commander's tactical terminal (CTT), and the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) to pass information and overlays. However, like his World War II predecessor, he employs radio communications, and occasionally messengers to pass information.

The I&R platoon supported the S-2 in World War II. In doctrine, he trained the platoon and provided mission tasking. In practice, he only influenced their missions and provided some training. The S-2 of today has a similar situation with the organic battalion Scout platoon. The role the S-2 plays in the training and missions of the Scout platoon varies by unit, much in the same way it varied in World War II. Nonetheless, the Scout platoon is a major source of information for the S-2.

The S-2 of World War II and the S-2 of the 1990s rely heavily in establishing personal credibility to function successfully in their units. The commander and the S-3 occasionally ignore the new S-2 in today's army.²⁴⁸ This occurs because the S-2 is of lesser rank and experience. The S-2 works hard to prove he is vital to a unit's mission success. The S-2 in the prewar U.S. Army and World War II had the same problem. The poor reputation of the intelligence profession and the use of intelligence assignments for mediocre officers compounded his situation. Today's S-2 has irrevocably shaken loose from the ghosts of the Louisiana Maneuvers.

Most importantly, the S-2 of today and the World War II S-2 share solid doctrinal underpinnings. Field Manual 30-5 was a landmark document that set a standard by which to measure the success of any army's doctrine. It developed from the seeds of senseless losses as American assault battalions, with little or no intelligence concerning German positions or capabilities, dissipated their strength in the trenches of World War I. Looking to the future, American doctrine writers composed a document that survived the vastness and violence of World War II. This document survived not just the European battlefield, but also the battlefields of the Pacific.

Also, the U.S. Army of World War II provided a comprehensive supporting doctrine for specialized intelligence operations. Already mentioned, FM 7-25 extensively covered the operations of the I&R platoon. Infantry and armor doctrine such as FM 7-20, Infantry Battalion, and FM 17-42, Armored Infantry Battalion, contained information on how to best utilize the intelligence sections supporting line units. The U.S. Army supported the specialist MIS teams with doctrine. The CIC used FM 30-25, Counterintelligence, for their operations. From the aspect of doctrine, intelligence personnel received excellent support the U.S. Army in World War II.

The situation is the same today. Field Manual 30-5's spiritual successor is FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. Published in 1994, it has not seen any stress to the intelligence system defined within its pages. However, based on the experience of American military intelligence operations over the last twenty years, it appears to be a thoughtful and comprehensive document for any intelligence officer to employ as a doctrinal guide. As with intelligence doctrine in World War II, intelligence operations and organizations are backed by a substantial body of doctrine. Field Manual 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, and FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, are just two examples of today's doctrinal manuals. The U.S. Army often updates intelligence doctrine to meet the changing realities of the post-Cold War era; however, it has successfully endured current challenges. In fact, intelligence doctrine survived the challenges

of peacekeeping operations, Somalia, and Desert Storm. However, it appears that today's intelligence doctrine is driven more by new technology than by any reaction to lessons learned on the battlefield.

Could the comprehensive body of doctrine developed by the U.S. Army's military intelligence community survive a conflict on the scale that challenged FM 30-5 during World War II? That would be predicting the future with certainty and that goes against a current U.S. Army doctrinal tenet of intelligence that survived from the 1920s to today. Intelligence personnel do not predict the future, they only reduce uncertainty about its impact on their unit's mission accomplishment. The similarities between the World War II era S-2 and the S-2 of the 1990s ends here.

The differences are as striking as the similarities. A combat arms officer occupied the S-2 staff position prior to and throughout World War II. He received little or no training, beyond a regimental or division school. The courses at these schools ran about two days. The curriculum varied by division as did the quality of instruction. The S-2 did not benefit from the comprehensive and centralized training enjoyed by the MIS teams. The officer serving as an S-2 became proficient through experience if he remained in the position for an extended length of time. There were combat arms officers who served in intelligence assignments over the majority of their careers. However, this occurred only at the strategic level. A World War II battalion S-2 sometimes served in his position for only a period of weeks. A battalion S-2 probably served as a platoon leader prior to assuming the staff intelligence role. He would then move onto another staff assignment or a combat arms command. Regimental S-2s served longer, but after their tour of duty they returned to their combat arms specialty for their next assignment. Brigadier General Oscar W. Koch concluded his career as the commander of the 25th Infantry Division in Korea.²⁴⁹

Today's battalion and brigade S-2s are almost, without exception, intelligence professionals. Tactical intelligence specialties did not exist in World War II. An intelligence officer today receives training to perform the duties of an S-2. The branch schools teach

intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to all officers in the U.S. Army. The S-2 has the key role in wargaming. An intelligence officer will receive six months of training in a basic course and six months of training in an advance course. A newly arrived intelligence officer serving as an S-2 in a battalion can rely on other intelligence professionals in his brigade and at division for assistance and advice. Part of an intelligence officer's career progression includes duty as an S-2, G-2, and J2. Most importantly, an intelligence officer serves at least twelve months as an S-2. Many intelligence officers serve twenty-four to thirty months as S-2s. This gives the S-2 tremendous experience in the conduct of intelligence operations in support of the combat commander. An intelligence officer with S-2 experience has a degree of creditability when reporting to a new unit. Colonel Schwien's vision in the 1930s has finally borne fruit.

These crucial differences in today's S-2 and the S-2 of World War II resulted from the terrible lessons of World War II and prompted the creation of a Military Intelligence branch. The similarities show that creating MI was a worthwhile venture, proving time and again on many recent battlefields, the hard won lessons of our intelligence past.

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

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